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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO MILITARY GOOD 
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE?
COLONEL JEREMY S. WEBER, USAF*
ABSTRACT
Discipline is often called “the soul of an army.” If this is so, the United States
military seems to be experiencing a spiritual crisis. Article 134 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) allows commanders to punish acts prejudicial to “good 
order and discipline,” but the reach of this provision has been increasingly limited in
recent years. Appellate courts have repeatedly overturned convictions of conduct 
charged as prejudicial to good order and discipline, and in recent years, the military’s
high court has issued a series of decisions limiting the reach of the UCMJ’s “general
article.” Congress has also recently acted to dramatically scale back the scope of 
Article 134. The result is that while military leaders might talk about the criticality of 
maintaining good order and discipline, commanders’ authority to actually punish 
behavior that detracts from good order and discipline is increasingly constrained. 
This Article ties the developments regarding Article 134 to a larger issue: the 
difficulty the military has demonstrated in defining what “good order and discipline” 
actually means. The term lacks an agreed-upon definition, and the military has not 
explored how changes in society and the military mission affect the term’s meaning.
In a series of policy reforms in recent decades, military leaders have generally cited 
“good order and discipline” as a basis for their opposition without defining the term 
or substantively exploring this concept. These reforms were ultimately enacted over 
military leaders’ objections without any apparent impact on good order and discipline. 
As a result, Congress and the media have grown increasingly wary of the good order 
and discipline term, diminishing its rhetorical weight. The military must take a more 
orderly, disciplined approach to defining this term, and this Article proposes a 
definition as a first step toward igniting this discussion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lieutenant Colonel George Washington’s admonition to his Virginia Regiment 
Captains—“Discipline is the soul of an army”1—is so frequently quoted that finding 
a writing about good order and discipline that does not refer to it is almost impossible.2
Lesser known and quoted is the similar, earlier observation of the French general and 
military theorist, Marshal Maurice de Saxe, who observed: “[Discipline] is the soul of 
armies. If it is not established with wisdom and maintained with unshakable resolution 
you will have no soldiers. Regiments and armies will be only contemptible, armed 
mobs, more dangerous to their own country than to the enemy.”3
If Washington and de Saxe are correct that discipline forms the soul of a military, 
then the United States military seems to be experiencing a spiritual crisis. Increasingly, 
the public perceives the military term of art “good order and discipline” not as 
representing a core principle of military effectiveness, but as rhetorical “chaff”4
military leaders use to voice their opposition to proposed reforms without actually 
communicating anything.5 In recent years, military leaders have employed the term to 
voice their opposition to a number of proposed personnel, social, and legal military 
                                                          
1 George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains: General Instructions to All the 
Captains of Companies (July 29, 1757), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-04-02-0223.
2 See generally John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
2000 ARMY LAW. 1, 6 (2000); William A. Moorman, Fifty Years of Military Justice: Does the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice Need to Be Changed?, 58 A.F. L. REV. 185, 188 (2000); 
Andrew S. Williams, Safeguarding the Commander’s Authority to Review the Findings of a 
Court-Martial, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 471, 481 (2014).
3 MAURICE DE SAXE, REVERIES UPON THE ART OF WAR 77 (Thomas R. Phillips ed. & trans.,
1944) (c. 1696–1750).
4 Used in this sense, “chaff” refers to “[a] passive form of electronic countermeasures 
consisting of expendable metallic fragments used to deceive airborne or ground based radar.” 
Robert A. Coe & Michael N. Schmitt, Fighter Ops for Shoe Clerks, 42 A.F. L. REV. 49, 96 app. 
III (1997).
5 David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Schlueter, Justice or Discipline?].
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reforms, and they have done so without clearly explaining what good order and 
discipline is or why it requires a certain position on these policies.6 In most cases, the 
military ultimately enacted those reforms without any measurable negative effect on 
good order and discipline.7 As a result, the linguistic impact of the term has come 
under fire from Congressional leaders and the media.8
This battle over the meaning and weight of the good order and discipline rationale 
has played out most recently in calls for military justice reform. The military justice 
system has long represented a delicate balance between protecting command authority 
to maintain good order and discipline and ensuring a just system that protects the rights 
of servicemembers.9 Over the past several years, however, concern regarding military 
sexual assault has spurred calls for reforms that would curtail commanders’ power 
over courts-martial and related actions.10 Despite agreeing to some modifications, 
military leaders have opposed proposals to remove certain prosecution decisions from 
the commanders of the accused servicemembers.11 Military leaders have consistently 
cited the need to maintain good order and discipline as the basis of that opposition.12
Thus far, those good order and discipline-based objections have proven somewhat 
effective; notwithstanding the numerous military justice reforms,13 commanders retain 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., id. at 54–55.
7 Id. at 5.
8 David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Song for Reform,
73 A.F. L. REV. 193, 224–25 (2015) [hereinafter Schlueter, Siren Song for Reform].
9 See Schlueter, Justice or Discipline?, supra note 5, at 4 (“In enacting the [Uniform Code 
of Military Justice], Congress struggled to balance the need for the commander to maintain 
discipline within the ranks against the belief that the military justice system could be made 
fairer, to protect the rights of servicemembers against the arbitrary actions of commanders.”).
10 See Schlueter, Siren Song for Reform, supra note 8, at 195–99 (summarizing proposals 
to limit or remove commanders’ powers to prefer court-martial charges or convene courts-
martial).
11 John W. Brooker, Improving Uniform Code of Military Justice Reform, 222 MIL. L. REV.
1, 2–3 (2014).
12 Robert Draper, In the Company of Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2014, at MM27 (“Above 
all, [Senator Claire] McCaskill and military leaders contend that commanders require such
prosecutorial authority, both to maintain good order and discipline and to make sure that 
accusers will have their day in court, even in a losing cause.”); Pauline Jelinek, Military Sex 
Assault Reports Increase 46 Percent in Year; Pentagon Says It Shows More Are Coming 
Forward, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2013, at A11 (“Military leaders have argued that removing the 
decision from their purview would undercut the ability of officers to maintain good order and 
discipline in their units.”); Sig Christenson, Panel Urges Caution in Changing Military Law,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (July 6, 2014), 
http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/military/article/Panel-urges-caution-in-changing-
military-law-5600619.php (“Pentagon leaders insist the authority is needed for commanders to 
maintain good order and discipline.”).
13 Each of the last several National Defense Authorization Acts contained provisions 
mandating significant changes to the military justice system. See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016) (enacting 
significant reforms to the military justice system, including changes to the composition of court-
martial panels, an expanded role for military judges before referral of charges, and 
reorganization of the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s punitive articles); National Defense 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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the authority to decide which cases do and do not get referred to trial, among other 
key decisions in the court-martial process.14 Still, reform efforts continue to be 
primarily modeled on principles of civilian justice and less on traditional notions of 
good order and discipline.15
Little noticed in the midst of this debate is a significant development in the 
military’s ability to prosecute acts prejudicial to good order and discipline. Article 134 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”)—one of the Code’s two so-called 
“general articles”16—specifically prohibits any conduct that is prejudicial to good 
order and discipline, among other actions. Once seen as reaching an “extraordinary” 
range of conduct17 and representing a critical aspect of commanders’ disciplinary 
authority, Article 134’s applicability has shrunk significantly in the past few years, 
particularly regarding its clause on conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.18
The result is that while military leaders talk about the importance of good order and 
discipline, their authority to actually punish behavior that detracts from good order 
                                                          
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 531, 129 Stat. 726, 814–15
(2015) (providing for a writ of mandamus to enforce victims’ rights in a preliminary hearing or 
court-martial proceeding); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 113-291, § 533, 128 Stat. 3292, 3366–67 (2014) (requiring the service secretaries to provide 
special victims’ counsel to victims of alleged sex-related offenses in certain circumstances); id.
§ 536, 128 Stat. at 3368 (directing the President to amend Military Rule of Evidence 404(a) to 
provide that the general military character of the accused is not admissible for the purpose of 
showing the probability of innocence of the accused for certain offenses); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1701, 127 Stat. 672, 952–54
(2013) (incorporating all the rights of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act into the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice); id. § 1702, 127 Stat. at 954–58 (limiting a pretrial UCMJ Article 32 
investigation to a preliminary hearing and limiting a convening authority’s ability to alter 
findings and sentence at clemency).
14 Tom Brune, Kirsten Gillibrand Military Sexual Assault Bill Fails in Senate, NEWSDAY,
Jun. 15, 2016, at 33; Bill Lambrecht, Military Abuse Reform Fails Again to Pass, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Jun. 17, 2015, at A1; Halimah Abdullah, Survivors of Military Sex Assaults 
Frustrated with Legislation, CNN (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/politics/military-sex-assault-survivors-speak-out/.
15 See, e.g., Nadia Klarr, Zero Tolerance or Zero Accountability? An Examination of 
Command Discretion and the Need for Prosecutorial Authority in Military Sexual Assault 
Cases, 41 DAYTON L. REV. 89 (2016); Elizabeth Murphy, The Military Justice Divide: Why Only 
Crimes and Lawyers Belong in the Court-Martial Process, 220 MIL. L. REV. 129 (2014); Greg 
Rustico, Overcoming Overcorrection: Towards Holistic Military Justice, 102 VA. L. REV. 2027
(2016).
16 See Edward J. Imwinkelried & Donald N. Zillman, An Evolution in the First Amendment: 
Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech Within the Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42, 43 
(1975) (“Articles 133 and 134 are the ‘general articles.’”) (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–34 (1970)). 
This Article refers to Article 134 as the “general article,” rather than as one of two general 
articles, mirroring language military courts often employ for Article 134.
17 HOMER E. MOYER, JR., JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY 1051 (1972).
18 Emily Reuter, Second Class Citizen Soldiers: A Proposal for Greater First Amendment 
Protections for America’s Military Personnel, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 323 (2007).
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and discipline is increasingly constrained.19 Article 134—the great “catch-all 
charge”20—therefore now catches less and less in its web.
This Article explores this phenomenon, focusing on the demise of Article 134’s 
clause regarding conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Section II begins 
with a brief history of the concept of good order and discipline in the military generally 
and in military law specifically, culminating in the codification of the modern UCMJ’s 
Article 134. Next, it demonstrates ways in which Article 134’s good order and 
discipline clause has proven difficult to enforce in military justice practice, and how 
these difficulties recently led Congress to drastically shrink the range of offenses 
covered under the general article. This Article then ties the developments regarding 
Article 134 to a larger issue: the military’s difficulty in defining what good order and 
discipline means. To address this situation, this Article proffers a comprehensive 
definition of the term that military leaders can use to specifically ground their positions
and proffers that the military justice system can better specify what conduct is and is 
not prohibited under Article 134. This Article concludes with a brief discussion of 
what the demise of Article 134 might mean for the military in future policy clashes 
and what the military needs to do to better articulate its good order and discipline-
based positions.
II. “GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE”—THE CENTRAL QUESTION
A. Good Order and Discipline in Military Law
For centuries, military leaders have recognized that discipline is a fundamental 
basis for military effectiveness. Sun Tzu listed “[o]n which side is discipline most 
rigorously enforced” as one of his seven considerations for predicting the victor in a 
conflict.21 The Roman writer Vegetius detailed the importance of military discipline 
at length, including his opening observation: “Victory in war . . . does not depend 
entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure [sic] it.”22
George Washington was not the only early American leader to emphasize the need to 
maintain discipline; John Adams also recognized that there cannot be “happiness or 
safety in an army for a single hour when discipline is not observed.”23 The emphasis 
on discipline has carried over to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as military 
leaders ranging from Scott to Sherman to MacArthur noted the importance of 
discipline in military organizations.24 More recently, the Air Force’s top military 
lawyer wrote that good order and discipline is the “fourth element of combat 
                                                          
19 Id. at 324–25.
20 Id. at 323.
21 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 6 (Lionel Giles trans., Thrifty Books 2009) (1910) (c. 500–
400 B.C.E.).
22 FLAVIUS VEGETIUS RENATUS, THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE ROMANS (DE RE
MILITARI) 9 (John Clarke trans., Greenwood Press 1944) (1767) (c. 390) [hereinafter VEGETIUS].
23 JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
ARMED FORCES, 1775–1980 3 (rev. & abr. ed., University Press of Kansas 2001) (1992) (quoting 
John Adams).
24 LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 3 (2010).
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effectiveness,” alongside people, training, and equipment.25 The Navy’s top enlisted 
member penned, “[v]ery few things have a greater impact on warfighting readiness 
and our ability to accomplish mission than Good Order [and] Discipline.”26 Modern 
military regulations repeatedly stress to commanders the central importance of 
maintaining good order and discipline.27
Military justice was established to help effect good order and discipline.28 Criminal 
military codes have long supported the imposition of discipline upon armed forces.29
Codes to impose punishment for disciplinary infractions date back to Richard the 
Lionheart in 1190, Richard II in 1385, and Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus in the 
seventeenth century.30 For much of its history, “military justice” was seen as an 
oxymoron; the system existed to bend to the will of the commander who was charged 
with maintaining good order and discipline, and any “justice” that the system achieved 
was more or less accidental.31 Post-World War II reforms in the United States sought 
to change this by creating a more just and less arbitrary system that better protected 
servicemembers’ rights.32 However, the reforms sought to achieve this goal without 
sacrificing commanders’ ability to maintain good order and discipline.33 As the 
preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial notes, “[t]he purpose of military law is to 
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, 
to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to 
strengthen the national security of the United States.”34 Even today, the focus on good 
order and discipline remains despite the fact that modern reforms have led to a court-
                                                          
25 Richard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice, 37 REPORTER 1, 5 (2010).
26 Mike Stevens, Zeroing in on Excellence: Good Order and Discipline (Part 4), NAVY 
LIVE BLOG (Nov. 23, 2012), http://navylive.dodlive.mil/ 2012/11/23/zeroing-in-on-excellence-
good-order-and-discipline-part-4/.
27 See, e.g., U.S. Air Force Instruction No. 1–1, Air Force Culture ¶ 2.1 (Aug. 7, 2012) 
[hereinafter AFI 1–1] (“Maintaining good order and discipline is paramount for mission 
accomplishment”); U.S. Dep’t of Army, Army Reg. 600–20, Army Command Policy ¶ 4–12
(Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter AR 600–20] (“It is the commander’s responsibility to maintain good 
order and discipline in the unit. Every commander has the inherent authority to take appropriate 
actions to accomplish this goal.”).
28 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Military Justice, in THE MODERN AMERICAN MILITARY 243 (David 
M. Kennedy ed., 2015).
29 Id. at 242 (“Just as military music has served a martial purpose for eons—trumpets did a 
pretty good job for Joshua and the Israelites at the battle of Jericho—so too has military justice 
served war fighters since virtually the beginning of organized conflict, because it plays a central 
role in establishing the discipline indispensable for martial success.”).
30 MORRIS, supra note 24, at 2.
31 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49–50 (2d rev. & enlarged ed. 
1920) (1886), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ ML_precedents.pdf.
32 Schlueter, Justice or Discipline?, supra note 5, at 4.
33 Id.
34 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. I, ¶ 3 (2016 ed.) [hereinafter MCM].
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martial system that “looks and works more like civilian courts than it did through most 
of its history . . . .”35
The need to maintain good order and discipline has been used to justify different 
procedures in the military justice system. The military justice system places 
commanders in the central disciplinarian role,36 and the system does not afford 
servicemembers the same rights afforded civilians.37 Winning wars remains a primary 
goal of the military justice system; a system aimed at promoting military effectiveness 
will always look somewhat different from one not burdened by such a unique and 
difficult objective. As voiced in 1974, the doctrine that posits that letting ninety-nine 
guilty men go free is better than convicting one innocent man “is not easily squared 
with the need to maintain efficiency, obedience and order in an army, which is an 
aggregation of men (mostly in the most criminally prone age brackets) who have 
strong appetites, strong passions, and ready access to deadly weapons.”38 Perhaps the 
most famous exposition of this reality comes from the Vietnam War-era book Military 
Justice Is to Justice as Military Music Is to Music:
It is one of the ironies of patriotism that a man who is called to the military 
service of his country may anticipate not only the possibility of giving up his 
life but also the certainty of giving up his liberties.
Historically, the man in uniform has been viewed as the property of his 
commanding officer, to be fed, clothed, rewarded and punished as the 
commander believed appropriate for the preparation for war and the waging 
of it. The serviceman has had to bend his personal life to what even such a 
libertarian as Chief Justice Warren tolerantly viewed as the “military 
necessity” for absolute discipline, order and conformity. If the serviceman 
does not bend, his commander—with the approval of the federal 
government—can break him at will.39
Despite its attempts to provide servicemembers with greater rights and protections, 
the military justice system still aims to serve commanders first by providing a means to 
                                                          
35 CHRIS BRAY, COURT-MARTIAL: HOW MILITARY JUSTICE HAS SHAPED AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO 9/11 AND BEYOND, at xii–xiii (2016).
36 Currently and historically, a lower-level commander “preferred” charges by initially 
serving charges on the accused, while a more senior commander has served as the “convening 
authority,” referring the case to trial, deciding matters such as whether to accept a pretrial 
agreement, and ultimately approving or modifying the results of the trial. See MCM, supra note 
34, at pt. II, Rule for Courts-Martial 307(a) (describing who may prefer charges); MCM, supra
note 34, at pt. II, Rule for Courts-Martial 705 (describing procedures for processing pretrial 
agreements); UNIF. CODE MIL. JUST. arts. 22–24 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 822–24 (2016)) 
(describing who may convene courts-martial) [hereinafter UCMJ]; UCMJ art. 60(c) (codified 
at 10 U.S.C. § 860(c) (2016)) (describing, before 2014 reforms, the convening authority’s ability 
to, “in his sole discretion” and as “a matter of command prerogative,” modify the findings or 
sentence of the court-martial).
37 Most notably, service members lack the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment 
in courts-martial. Williams, supra note 2, at 476–77.
38 JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 23 (1974).
39 ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC 1
(rev. ed. 1970).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
130 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:123
punish acts that impair good order and discipline. One of the primary means by which it 
does so is through the “general article,” UCMJ Article 134.
B. Good Order and Discipline in UCMJ Article 134
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the idea of a “general article” that 
would criminalize a broad range of conduct not otherwise punishable took root.40 First 
appearing in the Articles of War for 1625, the British general article took a number of 
forms, generally prohibiting “disorders,” “abuses,” or “offenses” not otherwise 
specified in military law.41 Likewise, in 1621, the Swedish Articles contained a general 
article making punishable “[w]hatsoever is not contained in these Articles, and is 
repugnant to Military Discipline,” among other matters.42 By 1765, the British Articles 
of War tacked on the words “good order” to “discipline,” prohibiting conduct “to the 
Prejudice of good Order and Military Discipline.”43 The pairing stuck, and the term 
“good order and discipline” remains in use to this day.
United States military law soon followed suit. A 1974 law review article noted: 
“With but minor variations, the General Article has been a part of the law governing 
military personnel from the very beginning of our national existence . . . .”44 In the era 
before the modern UCMJ, the Army and Navy each had its own military code, and 
each had a general article.45 At first, the Army’s general article only prohibited acts 
prejudicial to good order and discipline without reference to service-discrediting 
conduct. The 1890 Manual for Courts-Martial, for example, contained a code of 
military justice for the Army that prohibited “all disorders and neglects, which officers 
and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline . .
. .”46 By World War I, the Army code added service-discrediting conduct and all 
crimes or offenses not capital to the prohibition against “all disorders and neglects to 
the prejudice of good order and military discipline . . . .”47
The general article survived post-World War II military justice reforms.48 The new 
UCMJ, which applied to all the services, adopted the Army code’s general article, 
including its prohibition against all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good 
                                                          
40 D.B. Nichols, The Devil’s Article, 22 MIL. L. REV. 111, 113 (1963).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 115; WINTHROP, supra note 31, at 914.
43 WINTHROP, supra note 31, at 946.
44 Paul T. Fortino, Article 134 of the UCMJ: Will AVERECH Mean Taps for the General 
Article, 50 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 158, 158 (1974).
45 Id. at 159.
46 INSTRUCTIONS FOR COURTS-MARTIAL AND JUDGE ADVOCATES 47 art. 62 (1890), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1890.pdf.
47 A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF INQUIRY AND OF OTHER PROCEDURE 
UNDER MILITARY LAW 281 art. 96 (1918), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1918.pdf.
48 For an overview of reforms made to the military justice system after World War II, see 
LURIE, supra note 23, at 76–154. For extensive documentation detailing the legislative history 
of the creation of the modern UCMJ, see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice Legislative History, MIL. LEGAL RESOURCES (Apr. 2, 2013), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/UCMJ_LHP.html.
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order and discipline in the armed forces.49 Like earlier versions in the Articles of War, 
the article also punishes conduct “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces” 
as well as non-capital, civilian offenses that may be assimilated into the article.50
Article 134 remains today in substantially the same form as it did when enacted.51
Penalties for violating the general article’s conduct prejudicial to good order and 
discipline or service-discrediting provision vary widely, depending on the specific 
conduct involved.52
The provision criminalizing conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline 
proved the most controversial aspect of the UCMJ’s general article. Its broad scope 
has long been recognized as the “most comprehensive and potentially most subject to 
abuse; hence its traditional British nickname, ‘the Devil’s Article.’”53 Writing just a 
few years into the modern UCMJ’s existence, the man who would later become the 
chief judge of the military justice system’s highest court noted that “[t]remendous 
flexibility—and perhaps some vagueness—is incorporated” by Article 134.54 That 
same jurist elsewhere noted, in an article titled “Article 134, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice—A Study in Vagueness,” that the general article, particularly the prohibition 
against conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, operates with “awesome 
generality” such that its “true meaning might baffle the examination of the most skilled 
                                                          
49 UCMJ art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1950)); see also Fortino, supra note 44, at 
159 (“When formulating one law for the governance of all military forces, Congress chose the 
wording of the Army version and reenacted nearly verbatim Article 96 of the Articles of War, 
1916, into Article 134 of the UCMJ . . . .”).
50 UCMJ art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1950)).
51 UCMJ art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2016)).
52 The Manual for Courts-Martial lists several examples of offenses that may be charged 
under Article 134, each listing its own maximum punishment. These maximum punishments 
can vary significantly based on the underlying conduct. Assault with intent to commit murder 
or rape, for example, is punishable by a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances, and confinement for twenty years. MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 64e. Drunk and 
disorderly conduct not committed aboard ship or under circumstances to bring discredit upon 
the military service is punishable by confinement for three months and forfeiture of two-thirds 
pay per month for three months. Id. pt. IV, ¶ 73e(3)(c). For an Article 134 offense not listed 
under the Manual for Courts-Martial “which is included in or closely related to an offense listed 
therein the maximum punishment shall be that of the offense listed; however, if an offense not 
listed is included in a listed offense, and is closely related to another or is equally closely related 
to two or more listed offenses, the maximum punishment shall be the same as the least severe 
of the listed offense.” Id. pt. II, Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(c)(1)(B)(i). Article 134 offenses 
that are not specifically listed in the Manual for Courts-Martial, that are not closely related to 
or included in a listed offense, and that do not describe acts criminal under the U.S. Code or that 
have no maximum punishment authorized by custom of the service are punishable as a general 
or simple disorder, with a maximum sentence of confinement for four months and forfeiture of 
two-thirds pay per month for four months. United States v. Beaty, 70 M.J. 39, 45 (C.A.A.F. 
2011).
53 Michael Noone, Justice, Military: Military Crimes, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 356, 357 (John Whiteclay Chambers II ed., 1999); Nichols, 
supra note 40, at 112.
54 ROBINSON O. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
63 (1956).
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lawyer.”55 In 1972, a prominent military justice treatise suggested that “although the 
general articles may not rise to the level of unconstitutionality they may nonetheless 
be the source of significant unfairness and may not be necessary to fulfill the purposes 
for which they were originally designed.”56 Even the former Judge Advocate General 
of the Army, writing shortly after his retirement, called for the abolition of Article 
134, opining that the general article was unconstitutionally vague.57 He observed: “We 
don’t really need it, and we can’t defend our use of it in this modern world.”58
Not surprisingly, the article, particularly the provision regarding conduct 
prejudicial to good order and discipline, faced challenges in the improved appellate 
system created by the modern UCMJ.59 In a case soon after the codification of the 
modern UCMJ, the nation’s highest military appellate court admitted that the first two 
clauses of Article 134 (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline 
and service-discrediting conduct) presented “the conceivable presence of 
uncertainty.”60 However, the court held that “we do not perceive in the Article
vagueness or uncertainty to an unconstitutional degree,” noting that similar provisions 
had long been common in military law.61 The court thus held that, judging the article 
in historical context, “the clauses under scrutiny have acquired the core of a settled 
and understandable content of meaning,” particularly because the article listed 
numerous examples of acts that would constitute an offense under the general article.62
Over the ensuing years, military courts limited the scope of the article’s applicability,63
but also continued to reject vagueness challenges to the general article.64 The Supreme 
Court ultimately agreed two decades later.
In 1974, the Supreme Court faced the question about whether the general article—
along with its companion article criminalizing conduct unbecoming an officer and a 
                                                          
55 Robinson O. Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice—A Study in 
Vagueness, 37 N.C. L. REV. 142, 142 (1958).
56 MOYER, supra note 17, at 1053.
57 Kenneth J. Hodson, The Manual for Courts-Martial—1984, 57 MIL. L. REV. 1, 57 (1972).
58 Id.
59 See generally James A. Hagan, The General Article—Elemental Confusion, 10 MIL. L.
REV. 63 (1960) (detailing early challenges to the general article in the Court of Military 
Appeals).
60 United States v. Frantz, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (C.M.A. 1953).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 United States v. Holiday, 16 C.M.R. 28, 30 (C.M.A. 1954) (“Suffice it to say that the 
Article contemplates only the punishment of that type of misconduct which is directly and 
palpably—as distinguished from indirectly and remotely—prejudicial to good order and 
discipline.”); United States v. Norris, 8 C.M.R. 36, 39 (C.M.A. 1953) (holding that “Article 134 
should generally be limited to military offenses and those crimes not specifically delineated by 
the Punitive Articles.”); United States v. Smart, 12 C.M.R. 826 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (holding that a 
breach of custom may result in a violation of clause 1 of Article 134 if it satisfies the following 
requirements: (1) the accused violated a long-established practice; (2) the custom reflected 
common usage attaining the force of law; (3) the custom was not contrary to military law; and 
(4) the custom ceases when observance has been abandoned).
64 United States v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343, 345 (C.M.A. 1964); Frantz, 7 C.M.R. at 39.
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gentleman65—was unconstitutionally vague. Parker v. Levy66 was not the first 
Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of such a provision; the Court had 
ruled more than one hundred years earlier that the Navy’s general article, despite “the 
apparent indeterminateness of such a provision . . . is not liable to abuse; for what 
those crimes are, and how they are to be punished, is well known by practical men in 
the navy and army . . . .”67 However, Levy is the most significant case involving the 
modern Article 134. In Levy, an Army physician under a two-year military service 
agreement during the Vietnam War was court-martialed for various offenses arising 
from his refusal to conduct dermatology training for Special Forces and his anti-war 
public statements to enlisted personnel.68 The relevant specifications charged that his 
actions were prejudicial to good order and discipline and constituted conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.69 Captain Levy appealed his conviction, 
arguing that Articles 133 and 134 both were unconstitutionally vague and facially 
invalid due to their overbreadth.70
The Court rejected both challenges.71 Citations to Levy more often focus on its 
holding that the statutes are not overbroad because the First Amendment rights of 
servicemembers must sometimes yield to the demands of military discipline.72
However, the opinion is equally significant for its holding that Articles 133 and 134—
including Article 134’s conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline clause—are 
not unconstitutionally vague.73 In so holding, the Court found that Captain Levy had 
“fair notice from the language of each article that the particular conduct which he 
engaged in was punishable.”74 The Court acknowledged that “[i]t would be idle to 
pretend that there are not areas within the general confines of the articles’ language 
which have been left vague,” and noted the possibility that “sizeable areas of 
                                                          
65 UCMJ art. 133 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2016)).
66 See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
67 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 82 (1858).
68 Levy, 417 U.S. at 736.
69 United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 674 (A.B.R. 1968).
70 Levy, 417 U.S. at 741–42.
71 Id. at 741.
72 Id. at 758 (“The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for 
imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be 
constitutionally impermissible outside it.”). In the past five years, 117 law review articles and 
other legal journals have cited the majority’s holding, including 16 pieces that quoted the 
passage referred to here. See, e.g., Rodrigo M. Caruço, Treating Members of the Military at 
Least as Well as Inmates and Students: Determining When Military Necessity Requires 
Infringing Upon Constitutional Rights in Cases Before the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 61, 89 (2015); Rachel E. VanLandingham, Discipline, Justice, and 
Command in the U.S. Military: Maximizing Strengths and Minimizing Weaknesses in a Special 
Society, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 21, 64 (2015); Jeremy S. Weber, Political Speech, the Military, 
and the Age of Viral Communication, 69 A.F. L. REV. 91, 103 (2013).
73 Levy, 417 U.S. at 740.
74 Id. at 756.
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uncertainty as to the coverage of the articles may remain.”75 Nonetheless, the Court 
also noted that judicial limitations on the application of the articles, along with other
“authoritative military sources,” had interpreted the scope of the articles.76 The Court 
held that “less formalized custom and usage” could fill any further areas of 
uncertainty77 The Court drew attention to the sample specifications that Article 134 
lists in the Manual for Courts-Martial as well as military appellate decisions, finding 
a “substantial range of conduct” to which Article 134 may properly apply “without 
vagueness or imprecision.”78
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Levy disagreed as to whether modern 
military members still possessed a clear understanding of the meaning of “prejudicial 
to good order and discipline.” Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger concurred 
that the general articles are constitutional, asserting that the good order and discipline 
term is so ingrained in military members’ mindset that its meaning is plain and 
timeless:
My Brother Stewart [author of the dissenting opinion] complains that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily speculate as to what “conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” or conduct to the “prejudice of 
good order and discipline in the armed forces” or conduct “of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces” really means. He implies that the 
average soldier or sailor would not reasonably expect, under the general 
articles, to suffer military reprimand or punishment for engaging in sexual 
acts with a chicken, or window peeping in a trailer park, or cheating while 
calling bingo numbers. He argues that “times have surely changed” and that
the articles are “so vague and uncertain as to be incomprehensible to the 
servicemen who are to be governed by them.”
These assertions are, of course, no less judicial fantasy than that which the 
dissent charges the majority of indulging. In actuality, what is at issue here 
are concepts of “right” and “wrong” and whether the civil law can 
accommodate, in special circumstances, a system of law which expects 
more of the individual in the context of a broader variety of relationships 
than one finds in civilian life.
In my judgment, times have not changed in the area of moral precepts. 
Fundamental concepts of right and wrong are the same now as they were 
under the Articles of the Earl of Essex (1642), or the British Articles of War 
of 1765, or the American Articles of War of 1775, or during the long line 
of precedents of this and other courts upholding the general articles. And, 
however unfortunate it may be, it is still necessary to maintain a disciplined 
and obedient fighting force.
. . . .
                                                          
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 754.
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Relativistic notions of right and wrong, or situation ethics, as some call it, 
have achieved in recent times a disturbingly high level of prominence in 
this country, both in the guise of law reform, and as a justification of 
conduct that persons would normally eschew as immoral and even illegal. 
The truth is that the moral horizons of the American people are not 
footloose . . . . The law should, in appropriate circumstances, be flexible 
enough to recognize the moral dimension of man and his instincts 
concerning that which is honorable, decent, and right.79
The dissenting justices took a different view about the immutability of the term. 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, took the position that even 
if the idea of good order and discipline was once well understood, this does not mean 
this understanding remains fixed for all time.80 Rather, Stewart wrote, “I find it hard 
to imagine criminal statutes more patently unconstitutional than these vague and 
uncertain general articles.”81 He first noted that judges, scholars, and military 
publications had struggled to define the terms outlined in the general articles, 
including conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.82 He then examined 
whether modern military members really understood such terms:
It might well have been true in 1858 or even 1902 that those in the Armed 
Services knew, through a combination of military custom and instinct, what 
sorts of acts fell within the purview of the general articles. But times have 
surely changed. Throughout much of this country’s early history, the 
standing army and navy numbered in the hundreds. The cadre was small, 
professional, and voluntary. The military was a unique society, isolated 
from the mainstream of civilian life, and it is at least plausible to suppose 
that the volunteer in that era understood what conduct was prohibited by 
the general articles.
It is obvious that the Army into which Dr. Levy entered was far different. 
It was part of a military establishment whose members numbered in the 
millions, a large percentage of whom were conscripts or draft-induced 
volunteers, with no prior military experience and little expectation of 
remaining beyond their initial period of obligation. Levy was precisely such 
an individual, a draft-induced volunteer whose military indoctrination was 
minimal, at best. To presume that he and others like him who served during 
the Vietnam era were so imbued with the ancient traditions of the military 
as to comprehend the arcane meaning of the general articles is to engage in 
an act of judicial fantasy. In my view, we do a grave disservice to citizen 
soldiers in subjecting them to the uncertain regime of Arts. 133 and 134 
simply because these provisions did not offend the sensibilities of the 
federal judiciary in a wholly different period of our history. In today’s 
vastly “altered historic environment,” [precedent supporting the majority’s 
                                                          
79 Id. at 762–65 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
80 Id. at 773. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 774 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 777–78, 777 n.12, 778 n.13.
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holding] have become constitutional anachronisms, and I would retire them 
from active service.83
The majority’s holding remains good law, and both Articles 133 and 134 remain 
in effect to this day.84 The holding has survived because “application of Article 134 
has been limited by the President through the Manual for Courts-Martial, by the 
military appellate courts through case law, and by long established military custom 
and tradition to behavior that is easily recognized by [servicemembers] as subject to 
punitive sanction.”85 However, persisting issues continue to raise the question of 
whether the contours of the “good order and discipline” term are really understood, 
or, as the dissent held, whether the military has changed to the extent that good order 
and discipline now represents a nebulous concept.
III. ARTICLE 134—THE LONG RETREAT
Article 134 may have withstood Supreme Court scrutiny, but it did so only after 
early decisions by military courts limited its application and after the Supreme Court 
itself noted the law was subject to limitations by judicial and administrative 
interpretation.86 The limitations to the general article’s reach, particularly its 
prohibition against conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, have only 
amplified in the decades since Levy. Appellate courts overturned numerous Article 
134 convictions for failure to demonstrate that the appellant’s conduct was in fact 
prejudicial to good order and discipline.87 In recent years, the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces (“CAAF”) has taken steps to significantly limit the scope of Article 
134, leading to widespread reversals of court-martial convictions.88 Perhaps because 
of these difficulties, Congress recently has taken steps to significantly scale back the 
types of offenses charged under Article 134.89 The scope of the prejudicial to good 
order and discipline clause appears very much in doubt.
A. Offenses Prejudicial to Good Order and Discipline and the Proof Problem: 
Appellate Review
The government continues to charge servicemembers with offenses under the 
“prejudicial to good order and discipline” clause, and servicemembers continue to be 
convicted of such offenses.90 When appellate courts review those cases, however, the 
                                                          
83 Id. at 781–83 (footnotes omitted).
84 UCMJ art. 133 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §933 (2016)); UCMJ art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 934 (2016)).
85 United States v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 599 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting United 
States v. Peszynski, 40 M.J. 874, 879 (N-M.C.M.R. 1994)).
86 Levy, 417 U.S. at 740.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. 
Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 389 (C.A.A.F. 2009); United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
89 See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-
328 § 5187, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
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continuing struggle to understand the meaning and reach of “prejudicial to good order 
and discipline” becomes evident.
The problem of the clause’s ambiguity particularly presents itself in military 
courts’ review of guilty pleas to offenses charged as prejudicial to good order and 
discipline. In court-martial practice, an accused who pleads guilty must specifically 
admit to his or her misconduct so that the military judge may determine that the actions 
the accused admits to actually constitute the charged offense(s).91 In conducting this 
inquiry, the military judge must determine whether there is an “adequate basis in law 
and fact to support the plea before accepting it.”92 The military judge must explain the 
offenses to the accused and ensure the accused understands the elements of the 
offense, including the definition of terms contained in those elements.93 Appellate 
courts review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for an abuse of 
discretion by determining whether the record shows a substantial basis for questioning 
the plea.94
Instances of appellate courts overturning a military judge’s acceptance of a guilty 
plea normally are fairly rare,95 but when conduct allegedly is prejudicial to good order 
and discipline under Article 134, military courts have recurrently overturned 
convictions.96 Despite the deferential standard of review on such issues, a search of 
military appellate decisions revealed at least twenty-one cases since 1990 in which 
courts have overturned guilty pleas under Article 134’s good order and discipline 
clause.97 These cases expose a repeating pattern of accused servicemembers struggling 
to explain why they believed their conduct prejudiced good order and discipline.98
Likewise, in these cases, military judges generally have lacked the ability to help 
accused members articulate this point.99
United States v. Caldwell is a recent and illustrative example of this problem.100 In 
Caldwell, the accused pled guilty to wrongful self-injury in connection with a failed 
suicide attempt in his barracks room.101 This offense was charged under Article 134 as 
                                                          
91 MCM, supra note 34, pt. II, Rule for Courts-Martial 910 (c)–(e); United States v. Care, 
40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969).
92 United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 321–22 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing United States 
v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991)).
93 MCM, supra note 34, pt. II, Rule for Courts-Martial 910(c)(1) and Discussion; United 
States v. Redlinski, 58 M.J. 117, 119 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
94 Jordan, 57 M.J. at 238.
95 Cf. John F. O’Connor, Foolish Consistencies and the Appellate Review of Courts-
Martial, 41 AKRON L. REV. 175, 194–95 (2008) (explaining the requirement for the providence 
inquiry and observing that, while “military appellate courts have long allowed accused who 
pleaded guilty at trial to argue on appeal that their conviction should be overturned,” the 
standard for overturning a conviction is “relatively high.”).
96 See, e.g., Jordan, 57 M.J. at 239.
97 See, e.g., id.
98 See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 72 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
99 Id. at 142.
100 Id. at 137.
101 Id. at 140–41.
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either prejudicing good order and discipline or being of a nature to bring discredit 
upon the armed forces.102 During the providence inquiry, the military judge noted that 
the self-injury was an “odd charge” and asked the accused to explain why his suicide 
attempt should be considered criminal.103 The accused replied:
[A] lot of people were shocked. A lot of people didn’t know how to react 
towards it . . . . [s]o they would kind of talk to me a little bit and then back 
away. It was a touchy subject no one wanted to speak about. [I]t was just 
really weird for a couple weeks after that, sir.104
Further attempts at clarification revealed little additional information about why 
the self-injury attempt could be considered prejudicial to good order and discipline or 
service-discrediting.105 After a divided intermediate appellate court reversed the 
conviction only to reverse itself en banc,106 CAAF found the plea improvident.107 The 
court did find that a suicide attempt could constitute a criminal offense under Article 
134 and recognized that the suicide attempt of the accused was bona fide.108
Nonetheless, the court found the accused’s explanation was insufficient to establish a 
“reasonably direct and palpable injury to good order and discipline.”109
In United States v. Jordan, CAAF reversed an unlawful entry conviction when the 
military judge supplied “mere conclusions of law” in response to questions about 
whether his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline.110 In another case, 
the accused pled guilty to breaking restriction under the prejudicial to good order and 
discipline clause, but the military judge questioned him about whether the accused’s 
conduct was service-discrediting.111 CAAF set aside the finding of guilty.112
The intermediate service courts of criminal appeals have been active in overturning 
guilty pleas involving conduct charged as prejudicial to good order and discipline. For 
example, in United States v. Barnes, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals overturned 
a charge of carrying a concealed weapon based on the accused’s failure to explain how 
his conduct prejudiced good order and discipline (“Because it doesn’t show discipline 
that we have as Soldiers”).113 In United States v. Thatch, the Navy-Marine Corps Court 
                                                          
102 Id. at 138.
103 Id. at 141.
104 Id. at 139.
105 Id. at 142.
106 United States v. Caldwell, No. NMCCA 201000557, 2011 CCA LEXIS 181, at *2 (N-
M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2011).
107 Id.
108 Caldwell, 72 M.J. at 141.
109 Id.
110 United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Outhier, 45 M.J. 326, 331 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
111 United States v. Evans, 73 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (summary disposition).
112 Id.
113 United States v. Barnes, No. ARMY 20130529, 2014 CCA LEXIS 187, 2014 WL 
1247146 at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2014).
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of Criminal Appeals overturned a conviction for being drunk on station for the same 
deficiency, where the accused’s only statement to establish the prejudicial to good 
order and discipline element was his bare admission in response to a judge’s yes or no 
question.114 The Army overturned a conviction for communicating a threat, reasoning 
that the accused’s statement (“As a Soldier I’m supposed to have better control of my 
feelings and at that time I showed a total lack of control”) failed to establish prejudice 
to good order and discipline.115 The Army’s appellate court has been particularly active 
in this area as well, overturning or at least amending convictions on similar grounds 
in cases involving, for example, wrongful distribution of state controlled drugs,116
possession and importation of drugs,117 indecent liberties with a child,118 indecent 
language toward a child,119 a tattoo of a marijuana leaf,120 and numerous cases 
involving possession of child pornography.121 In several other cases, appellate courts 
upheld Article 134 convictions, but either did so through split decisions or through 
opining that the accused’s statements “narrowly” or “barely” established the 
prejudicial to good order and discipline element.122 This critical look at convictions 
under the good order and discipline clause seems to be increasing; in recent years, a 
disproportionate number of cases have overturned such convictions, perhaps 
indicating a growing frustration by appellate courts with the lack of clarity in this area.
                                                          
114 United States v. Thatch, 30 M.J. 623, 624 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990).
115 United States v. Hale, No. ARMY 20121020, 2015 CCA LEXIS 59, at *3–4 (A. Ct. 
Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2015).
116 United States v. Dallman, 32 M.J. 624 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
117 United States v. Stener, 14 M.J. 972 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
118 United States v. Parker, No. ARMY 20120713, 2014 CCA LEXIS 651 (A. Ct. Crim. 
App. Aug. 27, 2014).
119 United States v. Kelly, No. ARMY 20120990, 2014 CCA LEXIS 921 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
Aug. 26, 2014).
120 United States v. Arizmendi, No. ARMY 20110966, 2013 CCA LEXIS 552, 2013 WL 
3480276 (A. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013).
121 United States v. Doherty, No. ARMY 20160390, 2016 CCA LEXIS 702 (A. Ct. Crim. 
App. Dec. 2, 2016); United States v. Lopez, No. ARMY 20140891, 2016 CCA LEXIS 25 (A. 
Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2016); United States v. Haddox, No. ARMY 20140123, 2015 CCA 
LEXIS 371 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2015); United States v. Knight, No. ARMY 20130432, 
2015 CCA LEXIS 255 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June 17, 2015); United States v. Lacefield, No. 
ARMY 20120598, 2014 CCA LEXIS 84, 2014 WL 642950 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2014).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Groomes, No. ACM 38360, 2014 CCA LEXIS 752 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2014) (affirming, in a 2–1 decision, convictions of child endangerment and 
obstruction of justice despite rejecting one of the potential bases supporting the plea to the 
obstruction of justice plea); United States v. Ray, No. ACM S31431, 2009 CCA LEXIS 57, *7 
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2009) (holding, in a 2–1 decision, that the appellant’s plea to use 
of methylone was provident); United States v. Nance, No. ACM S31445, 2008 CCA LEXIS 
347 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2008) (finding, in a 2–1 decision, that appellant providently 
pled guilty to wrongful use of Coricidin HMP Cough and Cold medicine), aff’d 67 M.J. 362 
(C.A.A.F. 2009); United States v. Deggs, No. ARMY 20020133, 2005 CCA LEXIS 473, at *7–
9 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (upholding a guilty plea for dishonorably failing to maintain 
sufficient funds for payment of checks despite a “bare bones” providence inquiry and a 
“minimally adequate” factual basis).
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Adultery presents a special class of cases in which courts have closely 
scrutinized—and occasionally overturned—guilty pleas for conduct allegedly 
prejudicial to good order and discipline. Adultery is one of several enumerated
offenses under Article 134; it may be charged as an act prejudicial to good order and 
discipline or service-discrediting.123 The adultery offense was specifically added to 
Article 134 in 1984.124 By the 1990s, about 900 men and women were court-martialed 
for adultery.125 Until 2002, no special rules applied to adultery cases; the general 
requirement to prove conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or conduct of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces applied to adultery cases as with any 
other Article 134 offense.126
However, President George W. Bush amended the Manual for Courts-Martial in 
2002 to create a separate explanation of the terminal element applicable only to 
adultery offenses.127 The amended provision now sets forth the following with regard 
to proving that adultery is prejudicial to good order and discipline:
Adulterous conduct that is directly prejudicial includes conduct that has an 
obvious, and measurably divisive effect on unit or organization discipline, 
morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the authority or stature of 
or respect toward a servicemember . . . . Commanders should consider all 
relevant circumstances, including but not limited to the following factors, 
when determining whether adulterous acts are prejudicial to good order and 
discipline or are of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces:
(a) The accused’s marital status, military rank, grade, or position;
(b) The co-actor’s marital status, military rank, grade, and position, or 
relationship to the armed forces;
(c) The military status of the accused’s spouse or the spouse of co-actor, or 
their relationship to the armed forces;
(d) The impact, if any, of the adulterous relationship on the ability of the 
accused, the co-actor, or the spouse of either to perform their duties in 
support of the armed forces;
(e) The misuse, if any, of government time and resources to facilitate the 
commission of the conduct;
(f) Whether the conduct persisted despite counseling or orders to desist; the 
flagrancy of the conduct, such as whether any notoriety ensued; and 
whether the adulterous act was accompanied by other violations of the 
UCMJ;
(g) The negative impact of the conduct on the units or organizations of the 
accused, the co-actor or the spouse of either of them, such as a detrimental 
effect on unit or organization morale, teamwork, or efficiency;
(h) Whether the accused or co-actor was legally separated; and
                                                          
123 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 62.
124 Katherine Annuschat, An Affair to Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the 
Military, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1161, 1173 (2010).
125 Id. at 1164.
126 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶¶ 62(c)(2), 62(c)(2)(a)–(i) (2002 ed.).
127 Exec. Order No. 13,262, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,773 (Apr. 11, 2002).
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(i) Whether the adulterous misconduct involves an ongoing or recent 
relationship or is remote in time.128
This new language represented a “narrowing of the scope of the offense under the 
UCMJ,”129 making charging—and convicting—for acts of adultery more difficult for 
the military.130 Even with these changes, however, concern remains that these factors 
“have not yet been effective at stopping the arbitrary prosecution of adultery in the 
military.”131
Likewise, the factors have not obviated the need for courts to overturn adultery 
convictions. In United States v. Freeberg, the trial judge asked the appellant how he 
thought his adultery prejudiced good order and discipline.132 The best the appellant 
could muster was, “I guess the best I can say is perception is reality. I’m sure that 
somebody that I was working with or somebody at the command, you know, knew 
that I was married and the fact that I was having an affair with a fellow Marine looked 
badly upon myself and my credibility.”133 The Navy-Marine Corps Court held this did 
not suffice and set aside the adultery conviction.134 Likewise, the Coast Guard Court 
of Criminal Appeals overturned an appellant’s guilty plea conviction for adultery in 
United States v. Jonsson.135 In that case, the appellant proffered in his providence 
inquiry that his adultery was prejudicial to good order and discipline:
ACC: Because my command knew I was married, sir, and I had sexual 
intercourse with a seaman who I was directly supervising, sir.
MJ: All right. How about suppose other seamen who are part of the Deck 
Department found out you were having sexual intercourse with one of their 
peers, what do you think they would think?
ACC: It would bring disorder—I’m sorry. It would be somewhat 
disgraceful to our command.”136
The court held these statements failed to demonstrate that his adultery was 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting.137 Other recent cases 
exist in which appellate courts have similarly overturned convictions, finding a lack 
                                                          
128 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 60c(2).
129 United States v. Jonsson, 67 M.J. 624, 626 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Joint 
Annual Report of the Code Committee Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Oct. 
1, 2002 to Sept. 30, 2002), reprinted in 59 M.J. LXXIII (2004)).
130 See id. at 626.
131 Annuschat, supra note 124, at 1178.
132 United States v. Freeberg, No. NMCCA 201400172, 2014 CCA LEXIS 715, *4 (N-M. 
Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2014).
133 Id.
134 Id. at *9.
135 United States v. Jonsson, 67 M.J. 624, 628 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2009).
136 Id. at 627.
137 Id.
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of a connection between the adulterous act and prejudice to good order and 
discipline.138 Despite the efforts to specifically lay out factors demonstrating whether 
adultery prejudices good order and discipline, the issue remains subjective, “a strong 
criticism for continuing to allow the prohibition in its current form.”139 Similar 
restrictions and questions surround Article 134 prosecutions for fraternization.140
Appellate scrutiny of offenses charged as prejudicial to good order and discipline 
extend beyond guilty pleas. The services’ courts of criminal appeals have unique fact-
finding authority to determine for themselves whether an appellant’s guilt was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a power normally called “factual sufficiency.”141 While 
the service appellate courts rarely exercise their fact-finding authority to find 
convictions factually insufficient,142 they have at least intermittently done so in recent 
cases where they have found the government failed to prove Article 134 convictions 
met the prejudicial to good order and discipline element.143 In 2003, for example, the 
Army court overturned a conviction of an unmanned aerial vehicle instructor for 
                                                          
138 United States v. Harrod, No. ARMY 20120731, 2014 CCA LEXIS 325, at *4 (A. Ct. 
Crim. App. May 22, 2014) (modifying appellant’s adultery conviction, finding the appellant 
provided a factual basis to support that his adulterous conduct was service-discrediting, but not 
prejudicial to good order and discipline); United States v. Tadlock, No. ARMY 20110366, 2013 
CCA LEXIS 74, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2013) (holding that the appellant’s plea was 
“based on speculative prejudice or discredit that falls short of the prejudice or discredit required 
to constitute criminal adultery under Article 134, UCMJ”).
139 Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Other Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Adultery Under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice After Lawrence v. Texas, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 665 (2009).
140 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 83(c) (setting forth factors to consider in determining 
whether contact or association between officers and enlisted persons constitutes an offense 
under Article 134); United States v. Johanns, 20 M.J. 155, 160 (C.M.A. 1985) (upholding 
service court’s dismissal of fraternization specifications after finding that the appellant was not 
on notice that his sexual involvement with enlisted women was prohibited). Currently, the 
services have regulations prohibiting fraternization, and such conduct is normally handled as a 
violation of these regulations rather than as an Article 134 offense. Ronald D. Vogt, Trial 
Defense Service Notes: Fraternization After Clarke, ARMY LAW. 45, 46–47 (May 1989).
141 UCMJ art. 66(c) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2016)); United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 
324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987).
142 See United States v. Rivera, No. ACM 38649, 2016 CCA LEXIS 92, at *8 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. Feb. 18, 2016) (“Most cases reviewed by this court are deemed factually 
sufficient”); United States v. Mason, No. ACM 31015, 1996 CCA LEXIS 71, at *8–9
(A.F.C.M.R. Feb. 27, 1996) (Dixon, C.J., concurring) (“It is somewhat rare for this Court to set 
aside a conviction based upon factual insufficiency . . . . In the great majority of the cases we 
review, the record of trial readily establishes the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
143 United States v. Davis, No. ARMY 20100375, 2012 CCA LEXIS 184, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. 
App. May 23, 2012) (overturning adultery conviction, finding the appellant’s conduct was not 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting); United States v. Bristol, No. 
ACM 36956, 2009 CCA LEXIS 216, at *12–13 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2009) 
(overturning adultery conviction, finding the appellant took steps to keep the adulterous 
relationship circumspect, and the other person had no relationship to the appellant’s military 
installation); United States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1054 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (finding evidence 
legally insufficient to demonstrate appellant’s actions in having consensual sexual intercourse 
after testing positive for HIV were prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-
discrediting).
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engaging in an unprofessional relationship with students, finding “no convincing 
evidence” that his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline.144
More notably, in at least two cases, appellate courts that did not possess fact-
finding authority nonetheless overturned Article 134 convictions, finding that the 
government did not even present enough evidence of the prejudicial to good order and 
discipline element for a reasonable factfinder to have convicted the accused. The 
Army Court of Criminal Appeals upheld an Article 134 conviction in United States v. 
Wilcox for making anti-government and disloyal statements as well as statements that 
promoted racial intolerance on the Internet.145 The case then proceeded to CAAF,
which reviewed the conviction under a pure legal sufficiency standard: whether, 
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable 
factfinder could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.146
Even under this deferential standard, CAAF overturned the conviction, finding that 
the appellant’s speech was neither prejudicial to good order and discipline nor service-
discrediting because the government failed to introduce any evidence to meet this 
element.147 Similarly, in United States v. Warnock, the Army court lacked fact-finding 
authority because the case was forwarded to it for review by the Judge Advocate 
General rather than through the normal direct appeal process.148 The court held that 
under a legal sufficiency standard, no credible evidence demonstrated that the 
appellant’s act of photographing a female officer in the nude and showing the 
negatives to a junior enlisted soldier did anything to prejudice good order and 
discipline:
While the appellant’s conduct was certainly reprehensible and below the 
standards expected of a noncommissioned officer, Article 134 is not a 
“catchall as to make every irregular, mischievous, or improper act a court-
martial offense.” The requirement for “direct and palpable” prejudice to 
good order and discipline means that the conduct “must be easily 
recognizable as criminal, must have a direct and immediate adverse impact 
on discipline, and must be judged in the context surrounding the acts.” As 
Judge Kilday recognized long ago, “While some discredit no doubt attaches 
to any act or omission falling short of the optimum norm, it is settled that 
not every such incident is of the dishonorable, deceitful, and compromising 
nature recognized under . . . Article 134 of the Code.” A breach of the 
principles of leadership, standing alone, “generally is only a lack of good 
judgment—not a crime.”149
                                                          
144 United States v. Creighton, No. ARMY 20010208, 2003 CCA LEXIS 335, at *5–6 (A. 
Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 2003).
145 United States v. Wilcox, No. ARMY 20000876, 2006 CCA LEXIS 439, at *18–19 (A. 
Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2006).
146 United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing United States v. 
Dobson, 63 M.J. 1, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
147 Id. at 451.
148 United States v. Warnock, 34 M.J. 567, 569 (A.C.M.R. 1991); see also UCMJ art. 
69(d)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 869(d)(1) (2017)) (providing for appellate review of cases by 
order of the Judge Advocate General).
149 Warnock, 34 M.J. at 569–70 (citations omitted).
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Of course, appellate decisions such as these only arise after the government has 
succeeded in obtaining a conviction at trial by persuading the factfinder that the 
accused’s actions prejudiced good order and discipline. Clearing this hurdle can prove 
particularly difficult when it comes to the terminal element of prejudice to good order 
and discipline. In fact, how the government is supposed to introduce evidence to meet 
this terminal element in a litigated case is not entirely clear. At least one appellate 
decision has held that the the accused’s commander may not provide lay opinion 
testimony as to whether actions prejudiced good order and discipline.150 If the 
government cannot introduce this evidence, the factfinder must make its determination
based on the particular situation.
As the forerunner to CAAF noted in an early case:
Because of the many situations which might arise, it would be a practical 
impossibility to lay down a measuring rod of particulars to determine in 
advance which acts are prejudicial to good order and discipline and which 
are not. As we have said, the surrounding circumstances have more to do 
with making the act prejudicial than the act itself in many ways.151
Many acts charged under Article 134 may be perfectly lawful and appropriate 
depending on the context in which they occurred, requiring that “the factfinder must 
be certain that the prejudice or the discrediting nature of the conduct is legitimately 
focused toward good order and discipline or discrediting to the armed forces, and is 
not solely the result of personal fears, phobias, biases, or prejudices of the 
witnesses.”152 How exactly the government is supposed to lead the factfinder to this 
determination remains uncertain even after nearly seventy years of the UCMJ.
Compounding the problem is that the Manual for Courts-Martial contains no real 
definition of good order and discipline. The definition of “conduct prejudicial to good 
order and discipline” in the Manual reads as follows:
“To the prejudice of good order and discipline” refers only to acts directly 
prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial 
only in a remote or indirect sense. Almost any irregular or improper act on 
the part of the member of the military service could be regarded as 
prejudicial in some indirect or remote sense; however, this article does not 
include these distant effects. It is confined to cases in which the prejudice 
is reasonably direct and palpable. An act in violation of a local civil law or 
of a foreign law may be punished if it constitutes a disorder or neglect to 
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces.
. . . .
A breach of a custom of the service may result in a violation of clause 1 of 
Article 134. In its legal sense, “custom” means more than a method of 
procedure or a mode of conduct or behavior which is merely of frequent or 
usual occurrence. Custom arises out of long established practices which by 
                                                          
150 See United States v. Littlewood, 53 M.J. 349, 352–54 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (holding the 
military judge erred in allowing the appellant’s commander, over defense objection, to 
personally characterize the nature and effect of many of the appellant’s acts).
151 United States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466, 470 (C.M.A. 1953).
152 United States v. Guerrero, 33 M.J. 295, 298 (C.M.A. 1991) (upholding appellant’s 
Article 134 convictions for cross-dressing).
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common usage have attained the force of law in the military or other 
community affected by them . . . .153
This guidance provides no indication as to what good order and discipline is.
Instead, the guidance merely outlines the degree of prejudice necessary for UCMJ 
action and provides one broad manner in which an act may prejudice good order and 
discipline.154 Likewise, the Military Judges’ Benchbook, which expands upon the 
Manual’s definitions for hundreds of terms, offers no such assistance for conduct 
prejudicial to good order and discipline.155 The Benchbook merely apes the Manual’s 
requirement that such conduct causes “reasonably direct and obvious injury to good 
order and discipline.”156 Under these circumstances, individual judges or court 
members must decide for themselves whether specific acts prejudiced good order and 
discipline based on their individual, unstated, fact-specific criteria.157 This position is 
not an enviable one for the prosecutor.158
Occasionally, decisions in this area indicate that a certain classification of actions 
may be inherently prejudicial to good order and discipline and thus do not require 
evidence or specific admission to prove this element. In United States v. Smith, for 
example, the Navy-Marine Corps Court held that a superior’s courtship of an enlisted 
subordinate that resulted in adultery, all of which occurred on a military installation 
and frequently in the presence of other unit members, “was unequivocally to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline.”159 A later appellate decision interpreted Smith
to mean that some categories of acts are prejudicial to good order and discipline or 
service discrediting “on their face.”160 Likewise, the forerunner to CAAF held in 1988 
that cross-dressing on a military installation was conduct which “on its face, appellant 
should have recognized as having an adverse effect on good order and discipline and 
as being service-discrediting.”161 The Army court has occasionally stated that offenses 
involving moral turpitude are inherently prejudicial or discrediting.162 However, the 
parameters and continuing viability of an “inherently prejudicial” doctrine are not at 
all clear, and CAAF has declined to weigh in as to whether some acts are inherently 
prejudicial to good order and discipline.163 The lack of clarity leaves prosecutors, 
                                                          
153 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 60(c)(2)(a)–(b).
154 Id.
155 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27–9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK, ¶ 3-60-2a(d) (2014).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 451–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
159 United States v. Smith, 18 M.J. 786, 789–90 (N-M.C.M.R. 1984).
160 United States v. Thatch, 30 M.J. 623, 625 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990).
161 United States v. Davis, 26 M.J. 445, 446 n.1 (C.M.A. 1988).
162 United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 1038 (A.C.M.R. 1994); United States v. Poole, 
39 M.J. 819, 821 (A.C.M.R. 1994).
163 United States v. Brisbane, 63 M.J. 106, 117 n.11 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (“Because we conclude 
that the record contains specific evidence that Appellant’s conduct was service-discrediting 
and/or prejudicial to good order and discipline, we need not consider how, if at all, Free Speech 
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judges, court members, appellate courts, and servicemembers generally to guess at 
what is and is not prejudicial to good order and discipline.164
B. CAAF and the Scale Back of Article 134
For much of the UCMJ’s history, any “enumerated” offense—those specifically-
listed crimes in the UCMJ such as murder, rape, drug use, and larceny—was believed 
to automatically carry an element of prejudice to good order and discipline or a 
service-discrediting nature.165 The highest military court repeated in a series of cases 
that every offense listed in the UCMJ was “per se” prejudicial to good order and 
discipline.166 In United States v. Foster, the accused was charged and convicted with 
indecent assault and forcible sodomy.167 The intermediate service court set aside the 
conviction for forcible sodomy, but substituted a finding of guilty to committing an 
indecent act for the original charge.168 Upon appeal to the higher court, the appellant 
alleged that indecent acts is not a lesser-included offense of forcible sodomy, alleging 
that indecent acts (an Article 134 offense) required proof of the terminal element that 
forcible sodomy did not, and thus indecent acts were not “necessarily included” in the 
charged offense.169
The court rejected the appellant’s argument. It recognized that under the “plain 
meaning” of Article 134, a general article offense could not be a lesser-included 
offense of an enumerated offense because of the need to prove the terminal element 
under Article 134.170 However, the court rejected such a plain meaning view, holding 
that such a position would cause “incongruous results.”171 Instead, the court 
distinguished between the enumerated articles and Article 134 offenses, holding: “The 
enumerated articles are rooted in the principle that such conduct per se is either 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or brings discredit to the armed forces; these 
elements are implicit in the enumerated articles. Although the Government is not 
required to prove these elements in an enumerated-article prosecution, they are 
certainly present.”172 Several decisions following Foster repeated similar propositions 
asserting an expansive role for the Article 134 terminal element in military law.173
                                                          
Coalition applies to the Government’s argument that Appellant’s conduct, as an act of moral 
turpitude, was inherently prejudicial or service-discrediting.”).
164 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 60(b)(1).
165 United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 388–89 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
166 Id.
167 United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 141–42 (C.M.A. 1994).
168 Id. at 141 n.1.
169 Id. at 142.
170 Id. at 143.
171 Id.
172 Id. The court also cited an earlier case in stating that “it is merely a matter of historical 
accident that some offenses came to be assigned separate articles without that element, while 
others continue to be charged with the element under the general article.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Doss, 15 M.J. 409, 415 (C.M.A. 1983) (Cook., J., concurring in the judgment)).
173 United States v. Fuller, 54 M.J. 107, 112 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“[E]very enumerated offense 
under the UCMJ is per se prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting.”);
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However, in a series of cases beginning in 2009, CAAF reversed course, limiting 
the reach of Article 134 and its terminal element. First, in United States v. Medina, the 
court reviewed a soldier’s conviction for possessing and transporting child 
pornography and coercing a minor into producing child pornography.174 The appellant 
pled guilty to and was convicted of these offenses as violations of UCMJ Article 134, 
but not as acts prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting.175
Instead, the government charged the appellant with offenses under clause 3 of Article 
134, “crimes and offenses not capital,” because they allegedly violated the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA).176
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals found that the offenses did not violate the 
CPPA because that act did not apply outside the United States, but nonetheless 
affirmed the conviction because it found that the appellant’s actions were service-
discrediting.177 CAAF reversed the Army court, finding that a clause 1 or clause 2 
violation of Article 134 is not a lesser-included offense of a clause 3 violation because 
clause 1 and clause 2 violations contain an element that a clause 3 violation does not 
(namely, that the conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces).178 Thus, even though the court agreed that 
“the viewing of child pornography discredits those who do it, as well as the institutions 
with which those persons are identified,” the court held that because the appellant was 
not advised of the service-discrediting element, his guilty plea was not knowing.179
The importance of Medina to Article 134 became clearer a year later. In United 
States v. Miller, the court held that a simple disorder under Article 134 was not a
lesser-included offense of resisting apprehension (an enumerated offense rather than 
an Article 134 offense as in Medina).180 The Miller court specifically overruled its 
earlier precedent holding that every enumerated offense is inherently prejudicial to 
good order and discipline or service discrediting.181 The court extended this holding a 
year later in United States v. Jones, holding that “indecent acts” under Article 134 was
not a lesser-included offense of rape because indecent acts added an element not 
included in rape.182 The Jones decision required a complete re-examination of all 
                                                          
United States v. Sapp, 53 M.J. 90, 92 n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“[T]he elements of prejudice to good 
order and discipline and discredit to the armed forces are implicit in every enumerated offense 
. . . .”); United States v. Britton, 47 M.J. 195, 198 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (“[A]n offense under Article 
134 can be a lesser-included offense of an offense under an enumerated Article, notwithstanding 
the requirement under Article 134 to prove that the conduct was prejudicial or service-
discrediting.”).
174 United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 22 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
175 Id. at 24.
176 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2016); Medina, 66 M.J. at 22.
177 Medina, 66 M.J. at 24; United States v. Medina, No. ARMY 20040327, 2006 CCA 
LEXIS 407, at *9–10 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2006).
178 Medina, 66 M.J. at 26.
179 Id. at 27.
180 United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 388 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
181 Id. at 389.
182 United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 473 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
148 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:123
lesser-included offenses within the military justice system by holding that offenses 
listed in the Manual for Courts-Martial as lesser-included offenses could not be relied 
upon, particularly with regard to Article 134 offenses.183 Jones thus represented a 
“fundamental shift” in both the law of lesser-included offenses and Article 134’s 
reach.184 It was, in the words of a popular military justice blog, “a big freakin’ deal.”185
Taken together, the Medina, Miller, and Jones decisions are significant for their 
impact on lesser-included offenses, but more importantly because they represent a 
“narrowing [of] the reach of Article 134’s terminal element,” including the good order 
and discipline clause.186 In these three decisions, CAAF signaled a distaste for the 
broad scope of the good order and discipline and service-discrediting provisions. This 
point soon became clear in United States v. Fosler.187 Fosler represented the next 
evolution of the Medina-Miller-Jones rationale; whereas those cases examined 
whether Article 134 offenses were distinct from other offenses because of the terminal 
element, Fosler examined whether the government needed to expressly allege the 
terminal element on the charge sheet in order to properly place the accused on notice 
of the charge(s) against him or her.188 The court convicted Lance Corporal Fosler of 
adultery over his plea of not guilty.189 In accordance with long-standing military justice 
practice, the Manual for Courts-Martial’s model charging language at the time, and 
decades of precedent by the military high court, the government did not specifically 
allege that the accused’s actions were prejudicial to good order and discipline and/or 
service-discrediting.190 CAAF, however, extended Medina, Miller, and Jones, noting 
that these decisions demonstrate that “the historical practice of implying Article 134’s 
terminal element in every enumerated offense was no longer permissible,” and thus 
the cases “call into question the practice of omitting the terminal element from the 
charge and specification.”191 Noting that the three components of Article 134’s 
terminal element are distinct and separate, the court held that the terminal element 
language must be included in the charging language if it is not necessarily implied.192
                                                          
183 Id. at 473.
184 Patrick D. Pflaum, Lesser Included Offenses Update: United States v. Jones, ARMY LAW.
27, 27 (July 2010).
185 Mike Navarre, Top 10 Military Justice Stories of 2010—#4: The New LIO Jurisprudence,
CAAFLOG (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.caaflog.com/2010/12/31/top-10-military-justice-
stories-of-2010%e2%80%934-the-new-lio-jurisprudence/?hilite=jones#comments.
186 Weber, supra note 72, at 150.
187 United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225, 233 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 226.
190 Id. at 227–28; see also MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 60(c)(6)(a) (2008 ed.) (“A 
specification alleging a violation of Article 134 need not expressly allege that the conduct was 
“a disorder or neglect,’ that it was ‘of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,’ or that 
it constituted ‘a crime or offense not capital.’”).
191 Fosler, 70 M.J. at 228.
192 Id. at 230, 233.
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In the wake of the “revolutionary” Fosler decision,193 how far the decision would 
extend was not clear. Fosler involved a litigated charge and a defense objection to the 
charging language;194 it did not answer the question of what would become of all 
pending appellate cases in which the appellant had not objected to the charging 
language or had even pled guilty.195 The answer soon followed in United States v. 
Humphries.196 In that case, the court overturned an adultery conviction under Article 
134 where the terminal element language was not listed, holding that even though the 
appellant did not object at trial, the omission constituted plain error that prejudiced a 
substantial right of the appellant.197 Thus, the court held, unless “notice of the missing 
element is somewhere extant in the trial record, or . . . is ‘essentially uncontroverted,’” 
the failure to allege the terminal element language remains grounds for reversal even 
if the accused did not object.198
While CAAF later held that the failure to allege the terminal element language was 
not grounds for reversal in the case of a guilty plea,199 the combined impact of Fosler
and Humphries was momentous. No fewer than 107 cases saw at least one 
specification set aside based on CAAF’s new requirement for charging language.200
The specifications set aside include such serious offenses as negligent homicide,201
indecent acts with a child,202 willful discharge of a firearm,203 and communicating a 
                                                          
193 Mark Kulish, A View from the Bench: Charging in Courts-Martial, ARMY LAW. 35, 35 
(Sept. 2012).
194 Fosler, 70 M.J. at 226–27.
195 See id.
196 United States v. Humphries, 71 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
197 Id. at 214–15.
198 Id. at 215–16 (quoting in part United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002)); see
United States v. Gaskins, 72 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
199 United States v. Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
200 The author calculated this number by reviewing all 269 military justice cases that cited 
to Humphries and annotating the decisions in which either a service court of criminal appeals 
or CAAF set aside one or more specifications because of failure to comply with the Fosler and 
Humphries requirement. The author notes that he served as a judge on the Air Force Court of 
Criminal Appeals from 2013 to 2015 and acted upon some of these 107 cases.
201 United States v. Lindgren, No. ACM 37928, 2013 CCA LEXIS 330 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
Apr. 16, 2013); United States v. Books, No. ACM 37938, 2013 CCA LEXIS 78 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. Feb. 5, 2013).
202 See, e.g., United States v. Gaskins, 72 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2013); United States v. 
Valentin, 72 M.J. 450 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (summary disposition); United States v. Verdejo-Ruiz,
No. ACM 37957 (recon), 2014 CCA LEXIS 607 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2014); United 
States v. Bell, 72 M.J. 543 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2013); United States v. Carter, No. ACM 37715, 
2013 CCA LEXIS 1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2013); United States v. Swift, No. ARMY 
20100196, 2012 CCA LEXIS 459 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2012); United States v.
Bozeman, No. ARMY 20080711, 2012 CCA LEXIS 369 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2012).
203 United States v. Wall, No. ACM 37842, 2013 CCA LEXIS 418 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
May 17, 2013).
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threat.204 In six cases, the appellant had been convicted only of Article 134 offenses, 
meaning their convictions were dismissed in their entirety.205
The Fosler and Humphries decisions, coming on the heels of Medina, Miller, and 
Jones, demonstrated that CAAF “has . . . begun to cast a more skeptical eye towards 
the general articles of the UCMJ.”206 The decisions may not have overturned the 
general articles themselves, but they certainly impacted a number of Article 134 
convictions.207 The decisions “represent indications that the courts may be becoming 
less deferential towards the military over time, particularly when basic civil liberties 
claims are implicated and particularly with regard to the kinds of matters addressed 
by the general articles.”208 Even in the wake of these decisions, exactly how conduct 
under the general article should be charged remains uncertain.209 The decisions did not 
put an end to Article 134 generally or the good order and discipline clause specifically, 
but they do indicate a judicial tightening of the situations in which conduct prejudicial 
to good order and discipline or service-discrediting may be charged.210 What the future 
holds for the terminal element, including the good order and discipline clause, remains 
unclear.211
                                                          
204 Eleven cases saw at least one specification of communicating a threat set aside. See, e.g.,
United States v. McIntosh, No. ACM 37977, 2014 CCA LEXIS 29 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 
17, 2014) (communicating a threat and assault with intent to commit rape); United States v.
Bevers, No. ARMY 20100950, 2012 CCA LEXIS 481 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2012) (three 
specifications of communicating a threat); United States v. Dietz, No. ARMY 20081031, 2012 
CCA LEXIS 359 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2012) (communicating a threat and indecent act 
upon a child).
205 United States v. Swartz, 72 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (summary disposition) (solicitation 
to commit premeditated murder); United States v. Hudson, 72 M.J. 464 (C.A.A.F. 2013) 
(indecent acts with a child); United States v. Rodriguez, No. ACM 37878, 2013 CCA LEXIS 
672 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 11, 2013) (child endangerment); United States v. Thompson, No. 
ARMY 20100545, 2013 CCA LEXIS 470 (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 30, 2013); United States v.
McIntyre, No. ACM S31782, 2012 CCA LEXIS 468 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (six 
specifications of stealing matters from the mail); United States v. Justice, No. ACM 37446 (f 
rev), 2012 CCA LEXIS 356 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2012).
206 Jason Steck, Dissent Without Disloyalty: Expanding the Free Speech Rights of Military 
Members Under the “General Articles” of the UCMJ, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1606, 1626 (2012).
207 See United States v. Dietz, No. ACM 38117 (rem), 2014 CCA LEXIS 401 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. July 17, 2014); United States v. Miles, 71 M.J. 671 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2012).
208 Steck, supra note 206, at 1626–27.
209 For example, one issue is whether it is appropriate to charge an act as being either 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting (i.e., charging in the disjunctive). 
Several decisions have indicated potential problems with charging conduct under Article 134 in 
the disjunctive. See, e.g., Dietz, No. ACM 38117 at *5–6; Miles, 71 M.J. at 673.
210 See, e.g., United States v. Humphries, 71 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
211 Military appellate courts also have refused to expand Article 134 in one way following 
this line of cases. The preemption doctrine prohibits the government from charging a 
servicemember under Article 134 for conduct already covered by an enumerated article. Under 
this doctrine, conduct is considered to be already covered by an enumerated article if: (1) 
Congress intended to limit prosecutions for certain conduct to offenses defined in specific 
articles of the UCMJ, and (2) The offense sought to be charged is composed of a residuum of 
elements of an enumerated offense under the UCMJ. United States v. Wright, 5 M.J. 106, 110–
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C. Congressional Contraction of Article 134—The Military Justice Act of 2016
The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) contains the 
most significant and comprehensive revision of military justice in decades, if not in 
the history of the modern UCMJ.212 The law includes the “Military Justice Act of 
2016,” a series of reforms proposed by the Military Justice Review Group.213 Such 
reforms include standardizing the number of members detailed to a court-martial,214
authorizing military judges or military magistrates to handle certain issues before 
charges are referred,215 and overhauling sentencing procedures.216
The NDAA also significantly limits the scope of UCMJ Article 134 beyond what 
the courts have done in recent years. It removes thirty-four offenses currently 
contained under Article 134 and creates new enumerated offenses under the UCMJ 
for acts including several military-specific offenses. These military-specific offenses 
include misconduct by a sentinel or lookout;217 false or unauthorized pass;218
                                                          
11 (C.M.A. 1978). In light of the Medina-Miller-Jones-Fosler-Humphries line of cases, there 
was some indication that the preemption doctrine no longer should limit the government’s 
charging options under Article 134, as the emphasis in these decisions on the distinctiveness of 
the Article 134 terminal element indicated that Article 134 could never be composed of a 
residuum of the elements of an enumerated offense. United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 474 
n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (Baker, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority has also eliminated the issue of 
multiplicity and claims of preemption for clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ . . . .”). 
However, appellate courts have thus far continued to apply the preemption doctrine to bar the 
government from charging certain conduct under Article 134. See, e.g., United States v.
Costianes, No. ACM 38868, 2016 CCA LEXIS 391 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 30, 2016); United
States v. Rodriguez, No. ARMY 20130577, 2016 CCA LEXIS 145 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 
2016); United States v. Long, No. 2014–02, 2014 CCA LEXIS 386 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 
2, 2014).
212 R. Peter Masterton, Military Justice Review Group, FED. B. ASSOC. VETERANS & MIL. L.
SEC. NEWSL. 4, 4 (Spring 2016) (“The recommendations . . . constitute the most comprehensive 
revision of military criminal law since 1983.”); John McCain, Armed Services Chairman, 
Statement on National Defense Authorization Act Conference Report, in CONGRESSIONAL 
DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS, Nov. 30, 2016 (“Taken together, the provisions contained in 
the conference report constitute the most significant reforms to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice since it was enacted six decades ago.”).
213 The Military Justice Review Group is a collection of legal professionals directed by 
Department of Defense leadership to conduct a widespread review of the military justice system.
214 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 § 5187,
130 Stat. 2000 (2016).
215 Id. § 5202.
216 Id. § 5236 (providing for sentencing by a military judge unless the accused, following a 
conviction by members, elects sentencing by members); id. § 5301 (setting forth sentence 
minimums for certain offenses, spelling out factors the court-martial shall consider in 
sentencing an accused, and providing for government appeal of a sentence that violates the law 
or is “plainly unreasonable”).
217 Id. § 5411.
218 Id. § 5416.
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impersonating a commissioned, noncommissioned, or petty officer or agent or 
official;219 wearing unauthorized insignia;220 and incapacitation for duty.221
By removing these thirty-four offenses from Article 134, Congress removed the 
requirement to prove that the conduct is either prejudicial to good order and discipline 
or service-discrediting, reasoning that such offenses are “well-recognized concept[s] 
in criminal law” and thus do “not need to rely upon the ‘terminal element’ of Article 
134 . . . as the basis for [their] criminality.”222 The only offenses left under Article 134 
are those for which “there is a military-specific reason for utilizing the terminal 
element under Article 134.”223 By removing these offenses from the general article 
while not adding any listed offenses to Article 134, the new act will reduce the number 
of offenses specifically listed under Article 134 from fifty-three to just nineteen.224
This reduction will not remove the government’s ability to charge actions that do not 
fall under any listed offense as prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-
discrediting, but it will further limit the number of acts charged under Article 134.225
D. The Impact: The Decline of the “Good Order and Discipline” Clause of Article 
134
Article 134 may remain alive, but the courts and Congress have tightened the noose 
around its neck. The uncertainty regarding how to prove conduct charged as 
prejudicial to good order and discipline, the issues such cases face on appeal, and the 
Medina-Miller-Jones-Fosler-Humphries line of cases do not prevent the government 
from charging misconduct under Article 134. However, the difficulties general article 
cases present—and the general sense that Article 134 has reached too far—might be 
expected to result in a drop of its usage. In addition, the limitations on punishing 
adultery and fraternization under Article 134 should contribute to a decrease in the 
number of cases under the general article.
                                                          
219 Id. § 5417.
220 Id. § 5418.
221 Id. § 5424.
222 Military Justice Act of 2016: Section-by-Section Analysis,
http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/01-
General_Information/13_MJRG_MilitaryJusticeAct_2016_SecAnalysis.pdf (last visited Feb. 
1, 2017).
223 Art. 134, General Article (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. § 934 (2017)); see United States v.
Gaskins, 72 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
224 See MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶¶ 61–113 (listing offenses specifically itemized under 
Article 134).
225 This reduction in the number of specifically-listed offenses under Article 134 is the most 
significant such decrease, but it is not the first. The 2006 National Defense Authorization Act 
removed four listed offenses from Article 134 in the Manual for Courts-Martial (indecent 
assault, indecent acts or liberties with a child, indecent exposure, and indecent acts with 
another). MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV app. 27 (2008 ed.). In addition, in 1990, an executive 
order deleted the Article 134 offense of “requesting commission of an offense.” Exec. Order 
No. 12,708, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,353 (Mar. 27, 1990).
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To determine whether this has occurred, officials from the Army, Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps226 were asked to provide information about court-martial and Article 
15227 rates utilizing the general article. Specifically, this study sought information 
about the prevalence of charging conduct as prejudicial to good order and discipline 
under the general article. The services were asked to provide information about courts-
martial and Article 15 actions in which at least one specification involving Article 134 
was charged, dating back as long as reliable data was available.228
Three of the services responded. Air Force data revealed the numbers of total 
courts-martial (general, special, and summary) dating back to 1997 that contained at 
least one specification under Article 134:229
Year Number of Cases
1997 340
1998 256
1999 258
2000 269
2001 270
2002 281
2003 267
2004 321
2005 294
2006 237
2007 207
2008 205
2009 234
2010 250
2011 245
2012 192
2013 221
2014 169
2015 131
2016 107
The Air Force also provided the number of Article 15 actions since 1997:230
                                                          
226 The Coast Guard was not contacted, as its traditional caseload was determined to be too 
small to provide meaningful data.
227 Under this article, commanders may impose non-judicial punishment for minor offenses 
and impose punishments such as reduction in rank for enlisted members, forfeiture of pay, and 
extra duties. UCMJ art. 15 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2016)).
228 The author asked representatives from the military services whether such data was 
available specifically for offenses charged as prejudicial to good order and discipline (clause 1), 
but such information was not reliably available across the services.
229 Information obtained with permission from Air Force Automated Military Justice 
Analysis and Management System (Feb. 15, 2017) (on file with author).
230 Id.
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Year Number of 
Article 15 
Actions
1997 2122
1998 1717
1999 1720
2000 1810
2001 1818
2002 1754
2003 1819
2004 2048
2005 1658
2006 1531
2007 1360
2008 1298
2009 1274
2010 1201
2011 1260
2012 1296
2013 1249
2014 944
2015 737
2016 666
The Marine Corps was not able to provide information in response to the request, 
and neither the Army nor the Navy tracks Article 15 actions in a central database. The 
Army provided information about the number of general and special courts-martial 
(not summary courts-martial) that contained at least one specification under Article 
134 dating back to 1989:231
Year Number of Cases
1989 1077
1990 1005
1991 844
1992 806
1993 654
1994 657
1995 649
1996 607
1997 584
1998 548
1999 544
2000 469
2001 535
2002 613
                                                          
231 E-mail from Army Court of Criminal Appeals to author (Feb. 14, 2017) (on file with 
author) (compiling statistics for Article 134 courts-martial by year, upon request).
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Year Number of Cases
2003 541
2004 526
2005 639
2006 562
2007 585
2008 395
2009 374
2010 399
2011 446
2012 464
2013 441
2014 395
2015 326
2016 299
The Navy, meanwhile, only possessed statistics dating back three years for general 
and special courts-martial (not summary courts-martial) involving at least one 
specification of any clause of Article 134:232
Year Number of Cases
2014 93
2015 78
2016 83
The disparate and limited data available precludes many conclusions about 
whether Article 134 as a whole is being employed in a more limited manner in recent 
years. The data also sheds little insight into the specific issue of whether commanders 
are employing the prejudicial to good order and discipline clause less often in Article 
15 actions. However, two points from this data bear discussion.
First, the number of disciplinary actions utilizing Article 134 appears to have 
dropped markedly for the Army and the Air Force (and, to the extent the small sample 
size allows, the Navy). The Air Force saw a drop in Article 134 courts-martial from 
340 to 107 over twenty years and a drop in Article 15 actions from 2122 to 666 in that 
same time. Likewise, the Army’s number of Article 134 courts-martial dropped from 
more than 2800 to fewer than 800 since 1989. The Navy’s limited data also trends 
downward for Article 134 courts-martial. In interpreting the significance of these 
numbers, it is important to note that the overall number of courts-martial and Article 
15 actions have also trended downward during this period. The services provide an 
annual report by fiscal year showing their total number of courts-martial and Article 
15 actions, among other information.233 For the Air Force, total number of courts-
martial decreased from 1002 to 524 from fiscal years 1997 to 2015.234 Further, the total 
                                                          
232 E-mail from Navy Criminal Law Division to author (Feb. 10, 2017) (on file with author) 
(compiling statistics for Article 134 courts-martial by year, upon request).
233 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, ANNUAL REPORTS,
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/ann_reports.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
234 Id. (annual reports for fiscal years 1997 and 2016).
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of Air Force Article 15 actions fell by almost half, from 8481 to 4516 during this 
time.235 In the Army, while Article 134 general and special courts-martial fell from 
1077 in 1989 to 299 in 2016, total general and special courts-martial likewise dropped 
from 2619 to 862 during this period.236 Still, even accounting for total decreases in 
courts-martial and Article 15 actions, Article 134 cases have fallen at a substantially 
faster rate than overall actions across the board, with particularly notable decreases 
coming in recent years.
Second, the data also makes apparent that the Army utilizes Article 134 in courts-
martial somewhat more frequently than the other services.237 The Army has utilized 
Article 134 in roughly thirty-five to forty percent of its general and special courts-
martial most years since 1989.238 The Navy, by contrast, has utilized clause 1 of Article 
134 in about thirty percent of general and special courts-martial.239 The percentage of 
Air Force courts-martial that involved Article 134 offenses generally ranged between 
twenty-five and thirty-three percent.240
Despite the difficulties with its definition and employment, most notably reflected 
in recent appellate decisions, Article 134 (including the prejudicial to good order and 
discipline clause) remains in use. However, the number of Article 134 courts-martial 
and non-judicial punishment actions has fallen at a higher rate than overall disciplinary 
actions, and they can be expected to shrink significantly more as the elimination of 
many of the listed Article 134 offenses from the most recent NDAA take effect.241
III. THE DISORDERLY AND UNDISCIPLINED USE OF “GOOD ORDER AND 
DISCIPLINE”—REASONS FOR THE FALL OF THE GENERAL ARTICLE242
Why has Article 134 in general—and the prejudicial to good order and discipline 
element in particular—come under increased scrutiny in recent years? This Article 
proposes three interrelated reasons for this development: (1) the lack of an agreed-
upon definition for good order and discipline; (2) the changing nature of society, the 
military mission, and military demographics; and (3) overuse of the term, leading to 
widespread cynicism about the good order and discipline justification. Additionally, 
the increasing civilianization of military justice has further divorced the military from 
its understanding of good order and discipline, compounding the situation.
                                                          
235 Id.
236 Id. (annual reports for fiscal years 1989 and 2016).
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 § 5187,
130 Stat. 2000 (2016).
242 Much of the material in this section is adapted from a research paper the author completed 
as part of the in-residence curriculum for Air War College. The paper is pending publication by 
Air University Press as part of its “Maxwell Papers” series. It can be found at 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/education/jpme_papers/weber_j.pdf.
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A. The Lack of a Definition
To be enforceable, the two primary clauses of Article 134’s terminal element need 
to be understood. The second clause, “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed 
forces,” is fairly intuitive; if conduct tends to cast the military in a negative light, it 
violates Article 134.243 The Manual for Courts-Martial supplements this common-
sense understanding with a relatively clear, comprehensive definition for this element: 
“‘Discredit’ means to injure the reputation of. This clause of Article 134 makes 
punishable conduct which has a tendency to bring the service into disrepute or which 
tends to lower it in public esteem.”244 Appellate decisions have not wrestled with 
problems proving this element in the way that they have for conduct prejudicial to 
good order and discipline.245
“Good order and discipline,” however, represents something more elusive. 
“Discredit” is a word that civilians understand; a worker at Apple or General Motors 
understands what it means to bring discredit upon his or her employer. “Good order 
and discipline,” however, is a more uniquely military term. Military leaders 
throughout history agree that maintaining good order and discipline is centrally 
important to military effectiveness. However, the understanding about the importance 
of maintaining good order and discipline has not translated into meaningful dialogue 
as to what exactly good order and discipline is.
As noted above, neither the Manual nor the Military Judges’ Benchbook contains 
a substantive, meaningful definition of the term.246 Case law has not filled in the gap; 
several detailed searches located no case that expands upon the bare-bones definition 
in the Manual or the Benchbook. Likewise, the military does not define “good order 
and discipline” in its law, regulations, or doctrine.247 Even though the Department of 
Defense alone has 317 “directives,” 758 “instructions,” and 168 “manuals,” not one 
definition of this term could be found in any of these publications.248
A similar phenomenon exists for service regulations. Air Force Instruction 1–1, 
for example, states that maintaining good order and discipline “is paramount for 
mission accomplishment,” but nowhere defines that term.249 Likewise, Army 
Regulation 600–200 states several times that the commander must maintain good 
order and discipline but contains no discussion of its meaning.250 A search of 
Department of Defense and service websites revealed similar results: numerous 
                                                          
243 UCMJ art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2017)).
244 MCM, supra note 34, pt. IV, ¶ 60(c)(3).
245 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Core Criminal Law 
Subjects: Crimes: Article 134—General Article, OPINIONS DIG.,
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/digest/IIIA60.htm (last updated November 17, 2017).
246 See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
247 See Art. 1, Definitions (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. § 801 (2017)).
248 Defense Department (“DoD”) directives, instructions, and manuals can be found at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives./. The author used a search engine to search DoD 
publications for the “good order and discipline” term, reviewing each responsive document for 
a definition.
249 AFI 1–1, supra note 27,  ¶ 2.1.
250 AR 600–20, supra note 27.
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references to good order and discipline but no substantive discussion of what it means 
or how it applies.251 Even the 219-page Dictionary of United States Army Terms, which 
contains entries for terms such as “unit cohesion,” makes no attempt to define good 
order and discipline.252
Even finding contemporary secondary sources that attempt to define the term 
proves difficult. The Air Force’s Military Commander and the Law makes some effort, 
stating: “Commanders are responsible for maintaining good order and discipline 
within their command. Military discipline simply refers to a person’s ability to 
maintain self-control and conform to the military’s standards of conduct.”253 However, 
the guide does not cite to any source for this definition and is of limited authority in 
and of itself.254 In addition, the guide only defines “discipline,” not “good order,” and 
it seems overly narrow; if good order and discipline simply equates to self-control and 
conformance with standards, one wonders what the Article 134 element adds at all.255
In other words, if “prejudicial to good order and discipline” simply means that self-
control and conformance with standards has been impaired, every act or omission that 
violates a law, rule, or custom necessarily prejudices good order and discipline. The 
terminal element would then add nothing except to say that the accused has not 
“controlled” him or herself or that some standard has been violated.
A prominent military justice textbook makes another effort to define the term:
“Good order and discipline” are familiar watchwords of military law. 
Discipline can be achieved both formally and informally. For example, 
military instruction, drills or simply “a word to the wise” can help instill 
discipline in military personnel. At times, informal—indeed, illegal—
practices such as hazing can be thought of as a means of achieving 
discipline. The legal process for doing so can take a variety of forms, some 
of which are properly referred to as “summary” or “nonjudicial,” while 
others, typically reserved for graver forms of misconduct, involve a process 
that more or less resembles civilian criminal justice. Summary disciplinary 
cases vastly outnumber courts-martial.256
This, of course, is not so much of a definition of the term as a statement of how it 
might be achieved. The textbook’s explanation is also somewhat at odds with the 
Military Commander and the Law’s definition above, as it is difficult to see how 
compliance with standards could be achieved through violating other standards 
through illegal practices such as hazing.257
                                                          
251 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://search.defense.gov/search?affiliate=dod-
search&query=good%20order%20and%20discipline (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
252 U.S. Dep’t of Army, Army Reg. 310–25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Oct. 
15, 1983), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar310-25.pdf.
253 THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 119 (Richard A. Gittins ed., 3d ed. 1996).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 EUGENE R. FIDELL ET AL., MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 133 (2007).
257 Article 93 of the UCMJ criminalizes “cruelty and maltreatment,” which could encompass 
conduct such as hazing. UCMJ art. 93 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2016)). Service regulations 
also prohibit such actions. See AFI 1–1, supra note 27, ¶ 2.2.8 (“Airmen do not tolerate bullying, 
hazing, or any instance where an Airman inflicts any form of physical or psychological abuse 
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Some in the military have noted that good order and discipline lacks an effective 
definition. As early as 1949, an Air Command and Staff College paper concluded that
“[i]t would appear that there is no definition” of military discipline.258 The ensuing 
decades have not provided any meaningful clarity. A recent law review article by an 
Air Force officer noted: “Despite the accepted norm that good order and discipline is 
important, the actual definition of the term is murky at best.”259 Similarly, a recent 
study about diversity in the military concluded, “[t]he concept of good order and 
discipline is “admittedly . . . somewhat vague.”260 Even the Navy’s senior enlisted 
sailor could not put the term into words, saying good order and discipline is “difficult 
to define but easy to sense.”261
For that matter, it is not even clear whether good order and discipline refers to one 
unified matter or two related but distinct concepts. As discussed above, the term “good 
order and discipline” is a creature of military law and did not appear until the 1700s; 
before that, writings on the subject refer exclusively to “military discipline,” or more 
simply, “discipline.”262 In common usage, the term is more often used singularly 
though far from universally so; a Google search for “good order and discipline is” 
revealed about 23,000 hits while “good order and discipline are” brought back about 
9,900 results. Military regulations also use the term both ways, either as a singular 
concept263 or a plural one.264 No publication could be located that attempts to explain 
whether the phrase represents one idea or two.
Good order and discipline is an idea in search of a definition.265 This lack of a 
definition has not yet caused the courts to find Article 134’s clause 1 to be 
unconstitutionally vague, but it certainly has not inspired confidence with the courts 
or military justice reformers. The problem of a lack of definition has grown more 
                                                          
that degrades, insults, dehumanizes, or injures another Airman (unless it is part of an approved 
formal training program).”); AR 600–20, supra note 27, ¶ 4–19 (“Hazing, bullying, and other 
behaviors that undermine dignity and respect are fundamentally in opposition to our values and 
are prohibited. This paragraph is punitive.”); U.S. Dep’t of Navy, Secretary of Navy Instruction 
1610.2A, Department of the Navy (DON) Policy on Hazing ¶ 4 (July 15, 2005) (“Hazing will 
not be tolerated by any member of the Navy or Marine Corps.”).
258 Herbert S. Ellis, Is Discipline in the Air Force Adequate to Cope with Atomic War? 4 
(July 1949) (unpublished Air Command and Staff College research paper) (on file with author 
and at the Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama).
259 Anthony J. Ghiotto, Back to the Future with the Uniform Code of Military Justice: The 
Need to Recalibrate the Relationship Between the Military Justice System, Due Process, and 
Good Order and Discipline, 90 N.D. L. REV. 485, 521 (2014).
260 Jay Alan Sekulow & Robert W. Ash, Religious Rights and Military Service, in
ATTITUDES AREN’T FREE: THINKING DEEPLY ABOUT DIVERSITY IN THE US ARMED FORCES 99, 
126 n.101 (James E. Parco & David A. Levy eds., 2010).
261 Stevens, supra note 26.
262 See supra notes 21–43 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., AR 600–20, supra note 27, ¶ 4–12 (listing maintenance of good order and 
discipline as a goal (singular)).
264 See, e.g., AFI 1–1, supra note 27, ¶¶ 2.2, 2.2.5 (listing “good order” and “discipline” 
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pronounced over time, as the nature of the military’s mission, United States
demographics, and society have all changed, obviating any unstated sense that might 
once have existed of what the term really means.
B. Changing Times
One book that does attempt to define discipline (though not necessarily good order) 
does so as follows:
Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and positive obedience to the will 
of the leader. Its basis rests upon the voluntary subordination of the 
individual to the welfare of the group. It is the cohesive force that binds the 
members of a unit, and its strict enforcement is a benefit for all. Its 
constraint must be felt not so much in the fear of punishment as in the moral 
obligation it imposes on the individual to heed the common interests of the 
group. Discipline establishes a state of mind that produces proper action 
and prompt cooperation under all circumstances, regardless of obstacles. It 
creates in the individual a desire and determination to undertake and 
accomplish any mission assigned by the leader.266
This is the most comprehensive, workable definition found on the subject. The 
definition is also fifty-seven years old and was not updated throughout several editions 
of the book over the ensuing decades.267 This is unfortunate because even if this guide 
once represented a commonly-held understanding of what good order and discipline 
means, the meaning of this broad concept is bound to transform over time.
Traditionally, the concept of good order and discipline centered on providing 
commanders with broad authority so they can keep tight control over their forces.268
This authority was considered necessary for two reasons. First, warfare is inherently 
chaotic. For instance, servicemembers are directed to engage in three unique and
inherently unnatural actions: to kill other human beings, to risk being killed 
themselves, and when necessary, to refrain from killing others even when 
threatened.269 Moreover, servicemembers are asked to carry out these actions under 
harsh, stressful, and confusing conditions.270 Carl von Clausewitz’s On War captured 
this most famously, stating that “[w]ar is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of 
the factors in which war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
uncertainty.”271 Thus, under the traditional view, commanders must be granted 
authority to a degree not acceptable in civilian society to instill in their charges 
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absolute, conditioned obedience to authority even in the midst of chaos, when military 
members’ natural tendencies would be to do the opposite of what is demanded.272
The second traditional reason good order and discipline has normally been equated 
with near-absolute command authority is the fear of a military that becomes too 
powerful and oversteps its limited defense role. A military force that lacks good order 
and discipline risks committing war crimes or even upending civilian control over 
military forces.273 John Keegan’s classic work The Face of Battle captured this fear 
well:
Inside every army is a crowd struggling to get out, and the strongest fear 
with which every commander lives—stronger than his fear of defeat or 
even of mutiny—is that of his army reverting to a crowd through some error 
of his making. For a crowd is the antithesis of an army, a human assembly 
animated not by discipline but by mood, by the play of inconstant and 
potentially infectious emotion which, if it spreads, is fatal to an army’s 
subordination.274
Throughout much of military history, these two concepts forged the concept of 
good order and discipline. Commanders were thought to require a free hand, ruling 
their commands with near-absolute authority and granted the freedom to apply, when 
necessary, harsh methods that would not be permissible elsewhere.275 However, the 
environment in which the military operates has changed in recent decades. The nature 
of warfare, the pool of people from which the military draws, and society’s 
expectations on how military members will be treated all have undergone significant 
modifications. The formation of an all-volunteer force has brought different 
demographics, attitudes, and challenges to the military.276 Thus, the meaning of good 
order and discipline needs to adapt as well. As one 1972 military research paper noted: 
“Historically, discipline has been the cornerstone of all military organizations. 
Unfortunately, the cornerstone has never remained cemented in place.”277 To the 
ancient Greeks, good order and discipline meant fighting in close formation with the 
phalanx, which relied on each man holding his position and using his shield to protect 
the person to his right to allow the individuals to form a more cohesive and effective 
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fighting unit.278 But would good order and discipline necessarily mean the same thing 
to the Roman Republic, which employed a more flexible form of maneuver warfare?279
Would it mean the same thing in the age of muskets or nuclear weapons, or of Abu 
Ghraib or Twitter? The answer, obviously, is no—good order and discipline is not a 
“fire and forget” term; each generation, each service, and each unit must define what 
it means in that given situation.
The Levy concurring and dissenting opinions framed this issue well.280 Some 
assume that warfare and military service embody certain timeless principles such as 
good order and discipline.281 These people assert that “good order and discipline” may 
be more easily defined by common understanding and experience than words, but 
those who have served know exactly what it means.282 On the other side stand those 
who mirror Justice Stewart’s Levy dissent, arguing that the military’s inability to 
define good order and discipline reflects a fundamental confusion about what this 
supposedly core concept means.283 They assert that the nature of military service has 
changed in modern times, and if the military wants to use good order and discipline as 
a rationale to support its policies and laws (including punishing conduct that 
prejudices it), it needs to be able to articulate exactly what good order and discipline 
is in today’s military.284
New questions about good order and discipline need to be asked and addressed. 
For example, the changing composition of the military raises new questions. In an 
environment where the military has to compete with other employers for trained, 
skilled, and educated people, can the military afford to hold to a more traditional view 
of good order and discipline that analogizes military members to children?285 Can the 
military afford to impose the sort of rigorous training methods unacceptable in civilian 
society that are traditionally associated with instilling good order and discipline?286 Is 
the fear of a military representing a “crowd struggling to get out” as prevalent today, 
with the tradition of civilian control of the military presumably more firmly 
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THE GREAT 143 (Lee L. Brice ed., 2012).
279 Nathan Rosenstein, Armies of the Roman Republic, in THE ANCIENT WORLD AT WAR 
141–44 (Philip de Souza ed., 2008).
280 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 762–65 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 766–72 
(Douglas, J. dissenting); id. at 773–89 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 762–64 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
282 Id. at 748 (majority opinion).
283 Id. at 774–75 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 788.
285 Ellis, supra note 258, at 11–12 (comparing the use of discipline to train new soldiers for 
combat to a mother slapping her child’s hand to keep the child from touching fire and hurting 
himself).
286 WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING, MORALE AND ITS ENEMIES 119–20 (1918) (discussing the 
need to impose a loss of personal freedom and arbitrary stress in order to impose discipline; 
discipline “means subjections of the body to the mind; it means the superiority of the human 
spirit to the last efforts of wind and weather, and the demons of fear, pain, and fatigue. It is the 
element of Stoicism without which no man can do his living well.”).
40https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/8
2017] GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE 163
entrenched?287 What does good order and discipline mean when a majority of military 
members are married and over age twenty-five, and their education levels continue to 
rise, with most having at least some college education?288 Should commanders 
continue to hold a high degree of authority, when their subordinates may be 
increasingly mature and thus better able to discipline themselves?289
The nature of military missions has also changed. Modern American warfare is 
often more scientific and distant than the fighting associated with traditional good 
order and discipline notions.290 Increasingly, the military relies on standoff weapons, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, or even autonomous weapons systems.291 In such an age, to 
what degree does Clausewitz’s warning about war’s “primordial violence, hatred, and 
enmity” tendency apply, and what role does good order and discipline play in 
constraining this irrational tendency?292 In any event, how does good order and 
discipline effect these three unnatural actions? Is it by conditioned obedience to 
authority, as several traditional works argue and some views still hold?293 What does 
good order and discipline mean in an age where unquestioning obedience could 
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contribute toward wartime atrocities?294 Additionally, modern warfare often employs 
smaller, more disbursed units tasked to operate with flexibility and initiative.295 How 
does this affect good order and discipline’s meaning? Does the changing nature of 
warfare change the whole idea of good order and discipline from a fairly clear tactical 
meaning (failure to follow orders in combat can get nearby people killed unnecessarily 
or cause mission failure) to a more broad, amorphous meaning involving some mix of 
unit cohesion, deterrence, accountability, military culture, or command control?296
The fact that good order and discipline has not been defined clearly may be 
somewhat understandable. The concept is elusive, and a definition that works for the 
Air Force finance unit may not perfectly apply to an Army or Marine Corps 
expeditionary combat unit.297 However, the problem is not that the military has tried 
and failed to reach an agreement about good order and discipline’s meaning. Rather, 
the military exhibits an almost total lack of interest in even having the conversation.298
More and more in modern times, the good order and discipline term is not explored in 
any depth. A Google NGram report shows that the percentage of English language 
books discussing good order and discipline has steadily fallen between 1800 and 2008, 
to the point where the frequency of book-based discussion of the term is now less than 
a quarter of what it was in the early 1800s.299 During the same period, the percentage 
of books discussing the military generally has actually increased slightly.300 Searches 
of research papers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force’s senior developmental 
education schools for rising senior officers revealed several papers mentioning the 
term in passing, but almost none make any attempt to address what good order and 
discipline means, at least in recent years.301 Unfortunately, this failure to substantively 
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discuss good order and discipline comes at precisely the time when the military needs 
this discussion the most.
C. Overuse—Good Order and Discipline Fatigue
The lack of a standardized definition and the changes that have occurred within 
the military in recent decades have likely contributed to the diminution of the good 
order and discipline rationale, but the manner in which military leaders have used the 
term has damaged the term’s rhetorical impact far more. In recent decades, military 
leaders’ summary, short-hand use of the term has led to widespread critique that “good 
order and discipline” is nothing more than military slang for “we don’t like something 
but we don’t want to explain why.”302 Time after time since the mid-1900s, military 
leaders have used the term to voice their opposition to proposed reforms of the 
Pentagon’s personnel, social, or disciplinary policies, reforms aimed at 
accommodating modern sensibilities.303 Each time these reforms were proposed, the 
military pushed back, shrouding its objections in the language of good order and 
discipline.304
Law and tradition in the decades leading up to World War II supported the United 
States military services’ policy of racial segregation.305 However, the large-scale 
mobilization of World War II challenged the military’s racial segregation practices as 
never before. Challenges to racial segregation grew as United States citizens witnessed 
the skill of the Tuskegee Airmen,306 the unjust court-martial of Lieutenant Jackie 
Robinson,307 and the general bravery of more than 460,000 African-Americans serving 
in the war.308 The experiences of World War II combined with the burgeoning civil 
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rights movement to pressure the services into reexamining their traditional practices 
of segregation, but the military clung to its segregationist practices in the face of 
numerous challenges, many of which were brought by members of the armed forces.309
A post-war survey of Army officers indicated widespread concerns about 
desegregation, with most officers labelling desegregation as “bordering on 
irresponsibility” in large part because of the importance of the military’s social 
order.310 At times, the military defended its system of racial segregation on the grounds 
that integration “would interrupt the morale, discipline, and efficiency of fighting 
units.”311 Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall cited factors such as cohesion, 
morale, and discipline in cautioning against racial integration in the military.312
General Omar Bradley supported integration “as fast as our social customs will 
permit,” but warned that forcing “complete integration might seriously affect morale 
and thus affect battle efficiency.”313 The Chairman of the Navy’s General Board 
argued that in the close conditions inherent in military life, integration would cause a 
“lowering of contentment, teamwork, and discipline in the service.”314 Likewise, the 
Secretary of the Navy predicted that if black military members rose to leadership 
positions, they would prove unable to effectively discipline white subordinates, 
leading to a loss of “teamwork, harmony, and efficiency.”315 Ultimately, President 
Truman issued an executive order ordering equal treatment and opportunity for all 
military members.316
This pattern has repeated itself twice in recent decades. In the 1990s, shortly after 
the election of President Bill Clinton, the White House pushed the Pentagon to lift the 
long-standing ban on homosexuals openly serving in the military.317 Military leaders, 
including Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell, opposed the change by 
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citing the importance of unit cohesion.318 However, “good order and discipline” also 
formed a central tenet of the generals’ opposition,319 with General Powell telling the 
media, “[t]he military leaders in the armed forces of the United States—the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the senior commanders—continue to believe strongly that the 
presence of homosexuals within the armed forces would be prejudicial to good order 
and discipline.”320 Other generals echoed the “good order and discipline” justification 
for maintaining the ban,321 and Congress ultimately accepted these concerns in 
enacting the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law by finding that the “presence in 
the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in 
homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, 
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military 
capability.”322 Seventeen years later, military leaders’ reaction to proposals to lift the 
ban read much differently, as leaders such as Army Chief of Staff General George 
Casey stated they no longer believed the presence of homosexual service members 
caused an unacceptable risk to good order and discipline.323 Congress repealed the ban 
in December 2010.324 The Pentagon smoothly implemented the change in policy, with 
officials citing no adverse effect to the change.325
A similar pattern emerged with various proposals to expand opportunities for 
women in the military, including lifting the combat exclusion.326 Early in the evolution 
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of policies regarding women in combat roles, military leaders resisted change, citing 
“good order and discipline” as one of the primary justifications for their position.327
However, a series of moves opened additional combat opportunities for women, and 
in late 2015, the Secretary of Defense announced women would now be eligible to 
serve in combat, even as some military members continued to contest the move on 
good order and discipline grounds.328 To date, military leaders cite no adverse effect 
on good order and discipline from the move.329
In the past few years, the trend has continued with efforts to reform the military 
justice system to bring it closer in line to civilian practices. Driven largely by concerns 
about the military’s handling of sexual assault cases, recent National Defense 
Authorization Acts have imposed significant reforms, from providing a statutory set 
of rights to victims to reforming pretrial hearings to amending the Military Rules of 
Evidence.330 Most controversial, however, have been proposals to reduce the role 
commanders play in the military justice process or even remove them from the process 
altogether.331 Recent reforms have already dramatically limited the ability of 
commanders who convene courts-martial to grant clemency to convicted service 
members after trial.332 However, some Congressional leaders and special interest 
groups—led by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand—have pushed for even more dramatic 
reforms that would remove commanders from the decision-making process in courts-
martial333 and replace them with legal experts.334 Military leaders have opposed such 
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is “prejudicial to good order and discipline”).
328 William Denn, Women Deserve a Fighting Chance, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2014, at A17 
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331 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Military Chiefs Oppose Removing Commanders from Sexual 
Assault Probes, CNN (June 5, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/04/politics/senate-hearing-
military-sexual-assault/index.html.
332 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66 § 1702, 
127 Stat. 672 (2013) (limiting a convening authority’s ability to alter findings and sentence at 
clemency except in narrow circumstances).
333 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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proposals, largely rooting their objections in terms of good order and discipline.335
This time, however, the good order and discipline justification showed it had started 
to lose its rhetorical weight, coming on the heels of similar objections to proposals for 
racial, gender, and sexual orientation-based integration.
Senator Gillibrand, for example, expressed skepticism about military leaders’ good 
order and discipline-based rationale for maintaining commanders’ authority over 
courts-martial. In a Washington Post editorial, Gillibrand wrote:
The Defense Department tells us that if 3 percent of the most senior 
commanders don’t have the sole authority to decide whether a person 
accused of rape should be prosecuted, we will lose good order and 
discipline in our military. That same argument was used against integrating 
the services; against allowing women to serve; against repealing don’t ask, 
don’t tell; and against allowing women in combat. It wasn’t true then, and 
it isn’t true now.336
In a 2013 hearing, she similarly stated:
When we tried to repeal don’t ask, don’t tell, military commanders said you 
cannot possibly do this; this will undermine good order and discipline. 
When we wanted women to be able to serve in the military, they said you 
cannot possibly do that because of good order and discipline. When we 
integrated the armed services, commanders said you cannot possibly do 
this; it will undermine good order and discipline. We did it. We did every 
single one of those reforms.337
Senator Gillibrand was not the first member of Congress to make such an observation. 
Three years earlier, as Congress repealed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Congressman 
Bobby Rush made a similar connection: “[C]ritics of this amendment, and the repeal 
effort, have often stated that allowing open service will ‘disrupt unit cohesion’ and 
lead to a breakdown in ‘good order and discipline.’ These are the same arguments that 
were used in the 1940s to object to the integration of America’s armed forces.”338 Even 
as early as 1992, Representative Dave McCurdy posited that with the changing nature 
of society, the military, and warfare, “I think [the military is] going to have to define 
what ‘good order and discipline’ mean now.”339
These Congressional members’ criticisms have found increasing support in recent 
years, as the media and other commenters have questioned whether good order and 
discipline reflects a core principle of military effectiveness or the military’s rhetorical 
shortcut to voice its opposition to proposed reforms.340 Observing the military’s 
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337 159 CONG. REC. S8,041 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2013) (statement of Sen. Gillibrand).
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opposition to removing commanders from the court-martial process, one newspaper 
editorial claimed that opposition from military leaders on reducing commanders’ role 
in the system “is more about refusal to give up turf and authority than genuine concern 
for good order and discipline.”341 Another columnist asserted that without taking 
concrete steps to better recruit, train, and mentor women and thereby end sexual 
assault in the ranks, good order and discipline claims remained “just Pentagon 
rhetoric.”342 A third editorial called the military’s assertions “a red herring,” as the 
military justice system allows offenders to escape the consequences of their actions; 
the editorial rhetorically asked, “Where is the good order and discipline in that?”343
Other commenters place the military’s stance on military justice reforms in a 
broader context, mirroring the skepticism expressed above by members of 
Congress.344 These critics see the military’s good order and discipline-based concerns 
to military justice reforms as part of a pattern of intransigence that dates back decades, 
mirroring the military’s objections to proposed racial, gender, and sexual orientation-
based changes.345 A Huffington Post writer asserted:
[T]he insufficiency of [the good order and discipline] catch phrase as 
justification for opposing policy changes on issues of critical importance to 
our nation sound[s] eerily familiar to those of us involved in previous 
efforts to change military policies that were likewise opposed due to “good 
order and discipline.” Had we blindly obeyed, in response to the tactical 
deployment of this catch phrase in the past, we would not have integrated 
units, we would not have such a wide array of military occupational 
specialties open to women, and troops could still be fired if they were 
discovered to be gay or lesbian. All of these changes in military policy took 
place against the recommendation of many senior defense leaders and 
under the threat that such changes would negatively impact good order and 
discipline and impair the ability of military commanders—and the military 
as a whole—to function. We now know, however, that each of these 
changes not only did not corrode military and command capabilities, but 
instead greatly enhanced the capability and reputation of our armed forces 
. . . .346
A Chicago Tribune opinion piece made a similar observation when military leaders 
cited good order and discipline to oppose military justice reforms.347 The criticism is 
lengthy but illuminating of changing views on the willingness to defer to senior 
military leaders’ claims of what good order and discipline demands:
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Does that line of argument sound familiar? It should. It’s exactly what the 
military has said whenever it has been presented with a new requirement 
proposed by elected officials dissatisfied with existing policy.
In 1941, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall advised that efforts to 
bring about racial integration “are fraught with danger to efficiency, 
discipline or morale.” Adm. Chester Nimitz agreed that segregation was 
essential to “harmony and efficiency aboard ship.”
The brass took the same view of admitting women to the service academies. 
In 1974, Lt. Gen. Albert Clark, superintendent of the Air Force Academy, 
said “the introduction of female cadets will inevitably erode this vital 
atmosphere.” When the idea of putting women on Navy ships arose, a 
survey of sailors found most thought it would have “a negative impact on 
discipline.”
We got a reprise of this critique whenever anyone mentioned allowing gays 
in the military. During the 2010 debate in Congress, more than 1,000 
former generals and admirals signed a letter saying the ban was needed to 
“protect good order, discipline and morale.” 
But somehow our military managed to survive putting blacks and whites in 
the same billets. Somehow it became the most powerful fighting force on 
Earth following the intrusion of females. A year after gays were admitted, 
[General James F.] Amos said, “I’m very pleased with how this turned out.”
The people in charge of the services may have the best of intentions in 
dealing with sexual assault. But they have a habit of rejecting reasonable 
changes on the basis of fears that turn out to be unfounded.348
These two broader critiques do not stand alone; instead criticism about the 
military’s “good order and discipline” justification seem to be growing.349 A 1997 
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Newsday piece captured the sentiment many others would express later: the 
Pentagon’s use of good order and discipline “repeats—like a mantra—phrases such as 
‘unit cohesion,’ ‘morale and welfare’ and ‘service discrediting’ as if the very repetition 
of these clichés will prove its point.”350
Elsewhere, the author has empirically studied the validity of these allegations and 
found merit in them. That study will not be repeated here. In summary, that study 
revealed that critics’ concerns may have merit; military leaders’ use of the term has 
primarily come in opposition to proposed social, personnel, and military justice 
reforms and has reflected less substantive examination than cursory reflex.351 As a 
result, critics unsurprisingly have begun to allege that “good order and discipline” 
serves as a rhetorical device for the military to oppose proposals it does not like, rather 
than a meaningful operational concept.352
D. The Increasing Civilianization of Military Justice
In 2013, Undersecretary of the Navy nominee Dr. Jo Ann Rooney ran into 
difficulty during Congressional testimony when she expressed concern about having 
a judge advocate make court-martial decisions instead of a commander.353 Her 
statement, “I believe the impact would be decisions based on evidence rather than the 
interest in preserving good order and discipline,” drew Senator Gillibrand’s 
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criticism,354 and the White House ultimately withdrew the nomination.355 The 
withdrawal of Dr. Rooney’s nomination, however, highlights a long-standing 
unresolved question: What is the relationship between justice in a legal sense and good 
order and discipline? The traditional view was that good order and discipline 
demanded suppression of some legal rights, a view that lasted until World War II.356
After the war, however, Congress attempted to balance the need for discipline with a 
more just system, aiming for “a middle ground between the viewpoint of the lawyer 
and the viewpoint of the general.”357 This attempt to “balance” justice and discipline 
remains central in the military justice system, assuming some sort of tension between 
the two concepts.358 Some military leaders, though, have recently opined that no 
conflict exists between these ideas; instead, promoting justice automatically 
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strengthens good order and discipline.359 How exactly to “balance” two interests 
remains unclear.360
However, the balance increasingly is tilted in favor of justice over good order and 
discipline, as the system has been reformed to more closely mirror the civilian criminal 
justice system.361 Whatever internal debate may fester about the relationship between 
justice on the one hand, and good order and discipline on the other, Congress has made 
it clear in recent years that it is increasingly concerned about the former, even at the 
possible expense of the latter.362 The changes Congress has imposed upon the military 
justice system tilt in one direction only—toward the civilianization of military 
justice.363 As the military justice system grows to look more and more like its civilian 
counterpart, good order and discipline (whatever that term may mean) will naturally 
take a back seat in the system to due process and legal wrangling. Commanders, who 
maintain responsibility for maintaining good order and discipline, will revert to other 
means for carrying out their responsibilities.
As discussed above, the number of courts-martial and Article 15 actions has fallen 
precipitously in recent decades.364 A vicious circle thus ensues: the military has trouble 
articulating what good order and discipline is and what it requires, so Congress 
reforms military justice to emphasize justice over good order and discipline; 
commanders back out of the system, avoiding utilizing their primary tool for enforcing 
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good order and discipline; and good order and discipline suffer all the more. As one 
author observed:
For commanders to ensure service members abide by their orders, they 
must be able to effectuate punishment that is credible and transparent. 
Simultaneously, this punishment must be viewed as legitimate. A balanced 
military justice trinity weighing good order and discipline, due process, and 
the military justice system provides the commander with these tools. The 
current system, though, does not present this balance. The gradual increase 
of due process into the military justice system has rendered the court-
martial an obsolete tool, and consequently commanders rarely utilize it. 
Thus, commanders lack the capability to deter service member misconduct
. . . . [O]nly by restoring the balance, specifically by scaling back the extra-
constitutional due process rights afforded to accused service members, can 
commanders effectively combat the increase in service member 
misconduct.365
IV. A PROPOSED LIFELINE FOR ARTICLE 134 AND GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE
Ironically, the term good order and discipline is itself apparently in a state of 
disorder, a victim of undisciplined usage. The military holds to the notion that it 
remains different from civilian society, requiring a greater emphasis on good order 
and discipline than civilian life demands.366 However, the military’s inability (or 
refusal) to explain why and how it is different, and what exactly good order and 
discipline means today, imperils the very interests the military values.
This Article does not suggest that the concept of good order and discipline is 
unimportant. Anyone who has served in the armed forces understands the importance 
of good order and discipline, even if we do not exactly know what it looks like. The 
author has spent more than two decades in the military legal system defending 
commanders’ legal space in which to maneuver, supporting their authority to take 
actions they believed furthered good order and discipline within their units. Make no 
mistake: whatever good order and discipline means, the concept is vitally important 
to an effective military force.
Like Justice Potter Stewart’s famous statement on the difficulty of defining 
obscenity, some may have the sense of: “I know it when I see it.”367 Perhaps the term 
in modern parlance is used too generically, too summarily, and too loosely, and 
perhaps some questions surrounding what good order and discipline means may need 
addressed. However, its underlying notions—the importance of command authority, 
of a climate in which members willingly submit themselves to lawful orders, and of 
trust and service before self—remain cornerstones of military service, even if it is 
sometimes difficult to thoroughly explain what the words “good order and discipline” 
mean.
None of this matters, however, if the military cannot discipline itself on its use of 
the good order and discipline term. If the military continues to be seen as using the 
term as a rhetorical catchphrase to oppose proposed policy changes, and if it refuses 
to explain what it means by the term, the consequences could be significant. The 
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immediate impact of this failure of definition has been a judicial and Congressional 
shrinking of the UCMJ’s general article, particularly its clause prohibiting conduct 
prejudicial to good order and discipline.368 The military increasingly finds itself 
without one of its most important tools in preserving good order and discipline as the 
impact and use of Article 134 (particularly clause 1) continues to decline.369 The 
broader consequences could be more severe. If Congress, the media, interest groups, 
and the public continue to sense that “good order and discipline” is more a rhetorical 
smokescreen than a meaningful military concept, then the military will continue to 
lose public debates about policies it opposes. In the case of racial, gender, and sexual 
orientation integration, the shift to only a rhetorical smokescreen may not have been 
a bad development from a good order and discipline standpoint. The jury may still be 
out on military justice reform. The next change, whatever it may be, may not prove so 
innocuous.
The military desperately needs a workable definition of good order and discipline 
if it is to re-take this high ground. This Article offers the following definition to be 
employed in the Manual for Courts-Martial as well as service regulations. This 
definition is based on the best excerpts that discuss good order and discipline culled 
from a review of dozens of books, articles, public statements, and other sources. It also 
draws upon the more substantive discussion of the prejudicial to good order and 
discipline element applicable to adultery cases. The proposed definition is as follows:
Good order and discipline is the crucial component of military 
effectiveness. Military units require good order and discipline because 
military service requires a subjugation of self to the good of the whole to a 
degree not understood in civilian society, requiring service members to set 
aside their natural instincts of self-preservation and comfort-seeking 
behavior. The nature of military service requires good order and discipline 
to be instilled from the first day of military service and maintained at all 
times, whether in combat overseas or in peacetime operations in garrison.
Good order and discipline is a singular term, but it consists of two 
interrelated concepts. The first is good order. Good order means that the 
military unit functions in an organized military manner. Personnel 
understand their role in the organization and carry out their functions 
professionally and willingly. Members of the unit form a cohesive whole 
bound together out of a mutual sense of pride in the unit and a desire to 
have the unit succeed in its mission. Diversity of backgrounds, worldviews, 
and personal characteristics is welcomed and productive, with the non-
negotiable condition that each member seeks to integrate his or her own 
unique characteristics into the larger organization for its good. 
Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and positive obedience to the will 
of the leader, regardless of personal cost. Military discipline starts with the 
principle of command authority, in which a unit’s leader owns both the 
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authority and the responsibility for enforcing military standards and 
instilling a sense of obedience. In combat, military discipline represents the 
self-control to unwaveringly focus on the mission regardless of personal 
hardship, danger, fear, physical exhaustion, or distraction, recognizing that 
only through each individual obeying the lawful orders of his or her 
superior can the unit succeed. During in-garrison operations, military 
discipline may be even more difficult but is no less important, requiring a 
constant emphasis on the military’s core mission in order to maintain 
readiness for combat. Military discipline does not come naturally. It must 
constantly be instilled, cultivated, and reinforced. 
Good order and discipline does not equate to blind loyalty to the individual 
leader. Personal bonds between leader and follower are natural in effective 
units, and in most instances, good order and discipline demands obedience 
to the commander or leader. However, good order and discipline requires 
loyalty to the Constitution and the larger organization above any individual, 
including the leader, in the rare situations where those interests clearly 
diverge. 
The tools for instilling and maintaining good order and discipline include 
command presence and example, prompt and even-handed discipline for 
infractions, and recognition of exceptional performance. While changes in 
technology, demographics, and society may necessitate modifications in 
style, the underlying means and principles of leadership necessary to instill 
and maintain good order and discipline largely remain timeless.
To be punishable under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, acts must directly prejudice good order and discipline in an 
articulable fashion. Acts which remotely or indirectly prejudice good order 
and discipline may be dealt with through administrative action or other 
means, but not through punishment under this Code. Factors to consider in 
whether an act directly prejudices good order and discipline include:
(1) Did the act raise an appreciable risk of others engaging in similar 
behavior?
(2) Did the act negatively impact the unit’s performance to any measurable 
extent?
(3) Did the act negatively impact the authority, stature, or respect of unit 
leadership?
(4) Did the act occur during the performance of the member’s duty, on a 
military installation, or in the presence of other members of the unit?
(5) Was the act known to other members of the unit?
(6) Did the act occur after counseling or other actions taken regarding the 
same or similar conduct?
(7) Were other unit members placed in danger as a result of the act?
This definition may or may not be complete or ideal. However, it represents a first 
step for discussion, and its mere existence represents a significant step over the 
nebulous state of understanding regarding good order and discipline today. When 
military leaders use the term, they should do so deliberately and with reference to this 
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definition, and they should be prepared to explain why the needs for good order and 
discipline weigh in favor of their position. Likewise, military lawyers, commanders, 
and courts should employ the definition and its factors to determine what actions truly 
prejudice good order and discipline to the extent that they become criminal.
Finally, little analysis exists regarding the state of good order and discipline in the 
modern military. Does the military today enjoy a high level of good order and 
discipline or is it facing a crisis of indiscipline? The military has no answer to this 
question because it has no way to measure good order and discipline. Commanders 
generally host a “status of discipline” meeting at regular intervals to discuss recent 
episodes of misconduct and how those instances were handled.370 However, these 
meetings typically offer just a glimpse into the level of order and discipline on an 
installation, highlighting more serious instances of misconduct. Measuring good order 
and discipline simply by the frequency of misconduct discovered and handled through 
the military justice system surely reflects an overly narrow view of good order and 
discipline. Should the military have some gauge on the level of good order and 
discipline, perhaps involving a combination of combat effectiveness, the prevalence 
of war crimes, court-martial and non-judicial punishment rates, unit climate surveys, 
and inspections? Particularly in the military culture, leaders set the tone by what they 
pay attention to, measure, and control.371 Even with a definition of the term, the 
military cannot hope to achieve good order and discipline if it has no way of measuring 
it.
Defining good order and discipline, exercising discipline about use of the term 
consistent with the definition, and then measuring the level of order and discipline 
represent crucial steps toward reclaiming this core military principle. Without doing 
this hard work, the military risks the downward spiral of continued loss of the term’s 
rhetorical weight, which in turn may result in damage to good order and discipline.
V. CONCLUSION
To borrow an example from every military lawyer’s favorite movie, A Few Good 
Men’s Colonel Nathan Jessup famously accused the movie’s protagonist of using 
words like honor, code, and loyalty as a “punchline.”372 Today, the military 
establishment seems bent on doing the same with good order and discipline. For much 
of history, good order and discipline was seen as an unquestionably vital component 
of military effectiveness, a unique requirement that separated the military from 
civilian society. When the military talked good order and discipline, people listened. 
Today, however, good order and discipline is increasingly seen not as a
communication of a core military requirement, but as rhetorical camouflage. The 
immediate impact of this perception is a dwindling reach of the UCMJ’s once-
powerful general article, particularly its criminalization of acts prejudicial to good 
order and discipline. The long-term effects may be far more serious.
It is time for military leaders to do some soul-searching and re-discover what 
exactly good order means in the modern military. The “soul” of the American military 
                                                          
370 VanLandingham, supra note 72, at 60.
371 EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 246 (3d ed. 2004) 
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pay attention to, measure, and control . . . .”).
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is at stake; a disorderly, undisciplined approach to good order and discipline simply 
will not suffice.
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